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The term "Arctic" is not only ecological but also mythical. The term refers to the areas which 
were thought to be located under the constelation 'Ursa Major' (the Great Bear).  
J. Pentikäinen, Shamanism and Culture, Helsinki 2006, p.120. 
 
 
If we shadows have ofended, 
Think but this, and al is mended, 
That you have but slumber’d here 
While these visions did appear. 
And this weak and idle theme, 
No more yielding but a dream, 
Gentles, do not reprehend: 
if you pardon, we wil mend (..). 
     Wiliam Shakespeare, A Midsummer-Night's Dream, 
Epilogue, Cambridge University Press 1924. 
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Introduction 
  This is rather the first book with a title "Philosophy of Law in the Arctic" in the 
literature. This philosophy of law is a very wide and cross-disciplinary area of research: 
between law, philosophy, anthropology, history, cultural ecology or environmental studies. I 
have no doubts that we have done such kind of philosophy in the academia so far, not using 
this term, but keeping up with the concept, the idea. 
  The book is a result of research conducted by many members of the Sub-group of 
Philosophy of Law in the Arctic (the University of the Arctic). This team seems a very 
interdisciplinary academic group. Our cooperation bears fruit. 
  The aim of the book is to define and systematise Arctic legal philosophy problems. In 
this book, there are five thematic parts. Each part consists of two-five short articles (we can 
cal them also chapters or papers). These are the sixteen short articles al together. Each 
article consists of between six and fourteen pages. So going further, what we see in the book 
then is, in fact, a set of both theoretical and practical papers1. The topics of these papers 
(chapters) are diferent as the authors are different while representing a wide-ranging scope 
of academic disciplines or specialisations. Each paper is folowed by a relevant bibliography, 
which might be helpful for other scholars interested in the field. The seventeen writers come 
from such countries as Finland (4), Norway (1), Canada (3), Poland (3), Japan (2), Austria 
(1), Ireland (1), and England (2). Some of them have Arctic indigenous roots (3). In the end 
of the book, there is a very original atachment - the map of Arctic Canada. 
  That said, the content is divided to the five parts, shortly speaking, on fundamental 
concepts of philosophy of law in the Arctic (part I), Arctic cosmologies, beliefs, art and 
shamanism (I), Arctic lands and waters and the environment (II), indigenous rights and 
customary law (IV), and topics for the future like teaching philosophy of law in the Arctic or 
global governance through intercultural justice (V).  
  What is the idea? My idea behind the project is that we should always consider two 
issues as important sides of the same coin: one is indigenous legal philosophies, and the 
second is Western legal theory on indigenous peoples, laws, and problems. I would say 
shortly: it is about how "they" (Arctic indigenous people) think of the world of own laws and 
                             
1 Since the authors represent diferent academic disciplines, then we unified the references as far as possible. 
However, sometimes some differences between our referencing styles and customs were accepted in the name 
of diversity of our team. 
7 
 
our Western concepts and how "we" (Western scholars) think of them and our justice 
concerning their rights. 
  Obviously, in this book, the notion of legal pluralism is an important (theoretical) 
concept on the spot (vide: Dobrzeniecki's paper)2. However, this mentioned idea of the two 
ways of thinking shows also the existence of distinct and sophisticated legal philosophies in 
the Arctic. Furthermore, as a reminder one can roar that indigenous naratives such as 
cosmologies or beliefs are so extremely indispensable - we must never skip them (see: 
Dilon's and Joy's chapters). Of course, although we focus on international law concerning 
indigenous peoples (see: Szpak's paper, and Heinämäki's and the Valkonens' paper), we are 
also to conduct research on more political-moral-philosophical problems concerning the 
justification of indigenous rights in traditionaly occupied lands or waters (see: Usami's and 
Kuppe's papers). In this context, Canada's case and its chalenges and practical problems 
regarding the First Nations are interesting (see: Hanrahan's two chapters). This is true that 
discourses on indigenous customary law are stil coming (see: Svensson's paper). 
Comparatively speaking, (I)indigenous legal philosophy always is conceptualy, essentialy 
and "ideologicaly" so diferent from Western legal philosophy: it is more about harmony or 
the spiritual relationship to the past or the land (see: Tobin's or Johnson's papers, or again 
Heinämäki's and the Valkonens' paper). But philosophicaly speaking, the Arctic might be 
understood as a common good as wel (see: Hasegawa's paper). The common good always is 
the most important aim of law. It maters. 
  Plurality maters. Diversity maters. 
  When we realy understand how diverse in terms of laws a world is, not only the 
Arctic wil be safer and happier, but also our earth wil enjoy more peace and harmony, both 
of them we need so much now (vide also: Tobin's chapter again). This is true that globaly 
speaking, positive law regimes must be accompanied by customary (or natural) law regimes 
much more deeply than it is happening nowadays. 
  By the way, some more general reflections must come in the place: when I arived in 
Eastern Finland over three years ago, some thought came to me whether there would be 
possible to talk about e.g. Aristotle or Aquinas while in the Arctic. Maybe nay.. However, 
                             
2 But maybe Hoekema's "interlegality" is even beter: this concept means a kind of combination of both 
indigenous and Western laws. (That might be also seen like a mix in flux with the tragic history but a hopeful 
future.) 
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we can and should speak about other relevant issues concerning legal philosophy in the 
Arctic. Why? Because this kind of philosophy of law that is here, in the Arctic, seems so 
diferent and idiosyncratic (see: Husa's or Ginn's papers, or my chapter). Maybe this is the 
reason why, generaly speaking, scholars cumbrously grapple with philosophy of law in the 
Arctic. Not only the climate and the history have had some obvious direct impact on the 
exceptionality and peculiarity of topics of this Arctic legal philosophy, but also some other 
ways of thinking, which we enjoy in the Arctic, are crucial in this phenomenon. Who has not 
ever been to Inari or Karasjok, Nuuk or Labrador, Siberia or somewhere there in the North 
does not feel what we felt while writing our pieces concerning chosen issues on legal 
philosophy in the Arctic. This was our academic duty and privilege to release these thoughts 
we put on the articles of the book. 
 I want to thank you al the Authors so much for our common work and your 
impressive enthusiasm and incredible wil of cooperation. This, precisely speaking, e-book is 
given to your hands (or eyes), the felow Reader. Open your mind widely: it's the legal 
philosophy in the Arctic, what is a very distinguished and arduously but fascinatingly 
sophisticated topic, as I have grasped. That is not this weak and idle theme, but a dream about 
recognised diversity and plurality of laws and cosmologies. 
 
Dawid Bunikowski, The Editor 
Joensuu, North Karelia, Finland 
February-June 2016 
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1. 
What Is Philosophy of Law in the Arctic? 
 
Dawid Bunikowski 
 
Abstract 
The paper focuses on the essence of philosophy of law in the Arctic. It presents its diferent 
topics and ways of thinking. The author proposes a kind of systematisation of the concept. 
 
  1. Introduction 
  My aim is to answer the question what legal philosophy in the Arctic is. Old legal-
philosophical questions always sound like these: What is a law? What is justice? 
  My first impression is that Western philosophers of law must rethink own concepts, 
theories, models, methodologies, and narratives while conducting research on the Arctic, 
Arctic law, customary law and indigenous law in the Arctic. They should pay more atention 
to the real economic, political, environmental, and cultural processes actualy happening in 
this region as wel as to indigenous perspectives, concepts, and meanings. I think we need 
scholars with diferent academic backgrounds, who are interested in the mentioned topic (i.e. 
not only lawyers, but also Arctic anthropologists of indigenous religions and communities, 
historians, cultural ecologists or just philosophers). Inter(trans)-multi-cross disciplinarity is 
the clue. Also indigenous scholars are necessary in this scholarship, because they enjoy a 
kind of internal perspective or perception of what a law is for indigenous peoples (IP). 
 
  2. Questions 
 In particular, I claim that while thinking of the essence of the philosophy of law in the 
Arctic, I should answer two questions (I start from the Western perspective as a Western 
scholar): 
1) What is "Arctic indigenous peoples' law" from the point of view of Western philosophy of 
law? 
2) What is "law" for indigenous peoples in the Arctic? 
                             
 Part-time Lecturer Dr. Dawid Bunikowski (Finland; University of Eastern Finland Law School), the Chair of 
the Sub-group of Philosophy of Law in the Arctic, dawid.bunikowski@uef.fi 
(Originaly from northern Poland's smal ethnographical group "Kociewiacy".) 
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  Question 1 (Q1) concerns: concepts of law, justice, morality; sources of law and 
status of customary law in constitutional hierarchy of sources of law; relations between law 
and morality; jurisdiction and legal pluralism; the rule of law, nation state, sovereignty; 
rights, human rights; multiculturalism, political and cultural autonomy, self-government, self-
determination; the role of international law in recognising indigenous customary law and 
legal pluralism in the Arctic; the role of international law in resolving conflicts between states 
while in the Arctic. Here are the problems of moral and philosophical justification of the 
(universal) right of indigenous peoples to their own law as wel. Al ideas of protection of 
"distinct culture"3 come in this place, too.  
  These problems are quite new issues in the Western philosophy of law, which must 
finaly redefine own paradigms and seriously take a look at some chalenges, which have 
appeared in the Arctic recently (like climate change, indigenous rights movements). 
  Here we use Western terminology, models, and meanings to describe the phenomena. 
 In particular, contemporary legal philosophies (theories, jurisprudence) from the 
Arctic countries should be taken into consideration and studied (legal theories in United 
States, Canada, Finland, Greenland and Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Russia, and Sweden). 
However, it is justified to remember about legal-philosophical considerations in countries, 
which enjoy the status of observer states in the Arctic Council , too (i.e. France, Germany, 
The Netherlands, Poland, Spain, United Kingdom, People's Republic of China, Italian 
Republic, Japan, Republic of Korea, Republic of Singapore, Republic of India). 
 Question 2 (Q2) covers problems of relations of law and indigenous traditions, 
religions, cosmologies, mythologies or shamanism. The important relations are: the relation 
to land (like sieidi), ancestry, and the history/past (spiritual heritage) as wel as the relation to 
people, Nature, the cosmos (cosmology). The other serious issues are: "sustainable 
development" (relation: man-society-Nature); unwriten law as customary laws in particular 
areas (like reindeer husbandry, natural resources management; fishing waters, hunting 
grounds, shamanism); organisation of vilages or communities (like sida); indigenous 
redistribution of wealth; transmission of knowledge of own law; indigenous perception and 
value of law. 
                             
3 The phrase comes from R v Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075. The case concerned aboriginal fishing rights. See 
also this summary: htp:/casebrief.wikia.com/wiki/R_v_Sparrow. Another leading case of the Supreme Court of 
Canada on aboriginal rights was R v Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507, establishing the Distinctive Culture Test 
(the clue was that both the relationship of aboriginal peoples to the land and the distinctive cultures and societies 
of aboriginal peoples must be taken into consideration by courts). 
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  Here we use indigenous terminologies, naratives, and meanings to describe the 
phenomena, folowing the anthropological theory by Juha Pentikäinen4. 
  Indigenous scholars, by the nature of the state of things, are first invited to work on 
Question 2, but Western scholars are not excluded if they folow Pentikäinen's advice that 
scholars should use indigenous meanings and terminologies5. 
 
  3. Perspectives and topics 
  To sum up this part of considerations, we have two perspectives in our research: 
1) Western philosophy of law on indigenous law in the Arctic (Q1), 
2) Arctic indigenous philosophy(ies) of law (Q2). 
  Therefore, although indigenous law seems highlighted in Question 1, not only 
indigenous peoples' law in the Arctic is the most important subject there, but also other 
philosophical-legal issues, which are very related to indigenous law and interests or just to 
the region caled the Arctic6, are equaly crucial. These are as folows: 
- values of law (international, state, indigenous, customary etc.) in the Arctic: justice, 
diversity, peace, energy justice, the environment, 
- transnational governance, indigenous governance beyond state borders, changing 
sovereignty, changes of the rule of law, political decisionism (Schmit etc.), multiculturalism, 
justice and injustice in the Fourth World, 
- Western legal theory about environmental law, the right to clean climate, and restorative 
justice, 
- some classic topics in Western legal theory (like functions of law, sources of law) or legal 
anthropology (like interlegality7). 
  While Q1 says what we (West) say about them (IP, IP's law, rights, cultures, the 
Arctic) or how we want to use our theories (like legal pluralism) to describe their legal 
artefacts or just help them, Q2 says what they say about themselves (IP's law, culture) and us 
(Western theories, law, culture). 
                             
4 See how this idea was expressed in these essays: J. Pentikäinen, Shamanism and Culture, Helsinki 2006. 
5 Ibidem, p. 86. 
6 Also non-indigenous peoples live in the Arctic. The Arctic is administered rather by states and state 
governments than by indigenous peoples themselves stil. So this non-indigenous perspective of law must be 
also taken into consideration in order to "catch" the true picture of imaginations of law in the Arctic. 
7 See more: A. Hoekema, European Legal Encounters Between Minority and Majority Cultures: Cases of 
Interlegality, "Journal of Legal Pluralism" 2005, vol. 5, pp.1-28. Hoekema prefers to speak about 'local law' than 
'customary law'. He argues that it is wel known that often, surely in present days, indigenous peoples pick part 
of the dominant law and mix this somehow with their own law. Hoekema cals it 'interlegality'. See also: T. G. 
Svensson, Interlegality, a Process for Strengthening Indigenous Peoples' Autonomy: the Case of Sámi in 
Norway, "Journal of Legal Pluralism" 2005, vol. 51, pp. 1-78. 
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  4. Clash of values 
  Western societies chose own way of building a nation state. They invented concepts 
like commonwealth, sovereignty, democracy, and the rule of law. They started to colonise the 
Arctic and the indigenous nations like the Inuit in Greenland, Canadian Indians, Sami in 
Scandinavia and northern Europe. This is not like that these indigenous societies and 
communities had not known their ways of something what we cal democracy, law, and 
sovereignty. They knew them without us. They had the law and philosophy. Let us give two 
short examples of indigenous concepts. First, Rauna Kuokkanen shows e.g. the problem of 
the philosophy (logic) of the gift8. The philosophy of gift was the basis of indigenous peoples' 
relationships and communities and al the rules of social life as wel as rituals and beliefs. 
Secondly, Matias Åhrén describes the old Sami customary laws concerning natural resources 
management and their social, legal and political organisation. He uses terms such as sida or 
norraz, or kärreg9. Generaly speaking, Western scholars as (even) internal outsiders or 
(rather) external outsiders know rather litle about both. (There are some great exceptions). 
 Importantly, the West brought civilisation by violence. The West came with a sword 
and gun to make the Arctic Western. The West came with own meanings and in the name of 
own conceptions. Of many conceptions, nation state paradigm, progress, the Enlightenment 
were the most important. Nevertheless, this was against the traditional ways of life of the 
                             
8 R. Kuokkanen, The Logic of the Gift: Reclaiming Indigenous Peoples’ Philosophies, [in:] T. Botz-Bornstein, J. 
Hengelbrock (eds.), Re-Ethnicizing the Minds? Cultural Revival in Contemporary Thought, Amsterdam-New 
York 2006, pp. 251-271. 
9 See: M. Åhrén, Indigenous Peoples' Culture, Customs, and Traditions and Customary Law -- the Saami 
People's Perspective, Arizona Journal of International & Comparative Law 2004, vol. 21(1), pp. 63-112. 
See also more about Sami customary law in Western scholars' narratives: E. Niemi, Sami History and the 
Frontier Myth: A Perspective on the Northern Sami Spatial and Rights History, [in:] H. Gaski (ed.), Sami 
Culture in a New Era. The Norwegian Sami Experience, Davvi Girgi OS, Karasjok 1997, pp. 62‒85; T. G. 
Svensson, Indigenous Rights and Customary Law Discourse: Comparing the Nisga’a and the Sámi, "Journal of 
Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law" 2002, vol. 47, pp. 1-35; Ch. Alard, S. Funderud Skogvang (eds.), 
Indigenous Rights in Scandinavia: Autonomous Sami Law, Fanham: Ashgate Publishing 2015; D. Bunikowski, 
Indigenous Peoples, Their Rights and Customary Laws in the North: the Case of the Sámi People in 
Scandinavia and Russia, [in:] M. Lähteenmäki, A. Colpaert (eds.), East Meets North - Crossing the Borders of 
the Arctic, "Nordia Geographical Yearbook" 2014, vol. 43 (1), pp.75-85; D. Bunikowski, Sámi Reindeer 
Husbandry as a Way of Life: On Culture, Philosophy, Cosmology, and Law, [in:] T. Koivurova, W. Hasanat 
(eds.), Current Developments in Arctic Law 2015, vol. 3, University of the Arctic Thematic Network on Arctic 
Law, Rovaniemi 2015, pp. 3-6; 
See also chosen Sami scholars' narratives on Sami laws and culture: 
K. Näkkäläjärvi, Reindeer Earmarks as a Sámi Cultural System, [in:] J. Pennanen, K. Näkkäläjärvi (eds.), 
Sidastalan. From Lapp Communities to Modern Sámi Life, The Inari Sámi Museum, Inari 2003, pp. 140-147; 
K. Näkkäläjärvi, J. Pennanen, The Assimilation of Sámi Reindeer-Herding Administration into the Finnish 
Government, [in:] J. Pennanen, K. Näkkäläjärvi (eds.), op. cit., pp. 66-67; K. Näkkäläjärvi, J. Pennanen, 
Reindeer Herding and the Cycle of the Seasons, [in:] J. Pennanen, K. Näkkäläjärvi (eds.), op. cit., pp. 62-63; J. 
Pennanen, Reindeer Herding - the Defining Cultural Element in the Circumpolar Region, [in:] J. Pennanen, K. 
Näkkäläjärvi (eds.), op. cit., pp. 60-61; J. Porsanger, A Close Relationship to Nature - The Basis of Religion, 
[in:] J. Pennanen, K. Näkkäläjärvi (eds.), op. cit., pp. 151-155. 
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indigenous peoples in the Arctic. Who lost and who won in this batle is a rhetorical question. 
The West depreciated and almost destroyed the indigenous heritage of the Arctic. Now the 
indigenous rights movement is strong. It seems that there are some pangs of conscience on 
the Western side, too. The indigenous peoples' fate stired up compassion around the world. 
Historical Justice requires more recognition of indigenous rights. Nowadays then Western 
philosophy, also legal philosophy, may help to resolve some problems we are stil facing in 
our politics. As said Aristotle, there is no a happy society if only part of the society is happy. 
Aristotle himself says so: “One should cal the city-state happy not by looking at a part of it 
but at al the citizens.”10 
 
  5. Concluding remarks 
 To sum up, there are two ways in the philosophy of law in the Arctic. One, as we see, 
is moraly stronger, and it is about indigenous legal philosophies (Q2). These legal 
philosophies are the indigenous legal philosophies, which are based on indigenous 
philosophies at al. Here we have e.g. the philosophy of gift, described by Rauna Kuokkanen, 
or the old Sami customary laws, described by Matias Åhrén. Generaly, indigenous scholars 
are able to present these philosophies beter than Western scholars (even if the later are not 
excluded). 
  And there is another way (Q1). This second way goes through Western legal theory 
(philosophy) and its considerations on justice, environmental issues, minority rights etc. In 
this Western philosophy of law we combine both legal philosophy and moral and social 
philosophies. What we can propose as an interesting stuff for the Arctic, borowing from 
Aristotle, Cicero11, St. Thomas12, Justinian13, Immanuel Kant14, John Austin15, Herbert 
Hart16, Brian Tamanaha17, and Ronald Dworkin18, if any, is the question yet unanswered. 
                             
10 Aristotle, Politics, VII.9.1329a22–3, Translation: Barker, Ernest, revised by Richard Staley, Oxford 1995. 
11 See: Cicero, On the Laws (De Legibus), available at htp:/www.nlnrac.org/classical/cicero/documents/de-
legibus (04.02.2016). Cicero pointed out that al humans are naturaly equal, instead of living in different 
cultures. They al enjoy one universal and common law based on reason and Nature: Troubles, joys, desires, 
fears wander through the minds of al similarly. And if persons have diferent opinions, it does not folow that 
those who worship dog and cat as gods are not tormented by the same superstition as other races. Moreover, 
what nation does not cherish kindness, benevolence, or a soul that is grateful for and mindful of a benefit? What 
nation does not despise, does not hate the haughty, the nefarious, the cruel, the ungrateful? Since from these 
things it may be understood that the whole race of human beings has been united among themselves, the final 
result is that knowledge of living correctly makes persons beter. (Cicero, 31). 
12 See: St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Of the Essence of Law, available at 
htp:/www.newadvent.org/summa/2090.htm (22.02.2016). He indicates the most important aim of law in this 
way: Consequently, since the law is chiefly ordained to the common good, any other precept in regard to some 
15 
 
  These two ways, poeticaly speaking, should march together, like two sides of the 
same coin, like two birds in one pair, like two soldiers of the same batalion. Of course, the 
Arctic indigenous legal tradition is more spiritual, always related to Nature. Western legal 
philosophy is more "rational" and procedure-oriented nowadays. But not always it was like it 
is now. Western philosophical traditions are deeply spiritual also. For example, Nature was 
the most important criterion for the Greeks or Romans. Philosophy of Stoicism is one of the 
idiosyncratic signs of this atitude. However, these two ways of thinking are diferent like 
diferent are environments in which these ways of thinking and doing things have been 
adopted and developed for centuries. Probably, we enjoy also different imaginations of what 
a legal philosophy is. The aim is to make them both get together in the Arctic. The way is to 
traverse by progressing steadily and rhythmicaly in this new science and enkindle new 
notions. 
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2. 
Arctic Legal Tradition? 
 
Jaakko Husa 
 
Abstract 
This short article does not deal with narowly understood public international law related 
questions or legal-political disputes over the Arctic, instead, it asks if there is something we 
might label as an Arctic legal tradition. 
 
1. Introduction 
The Arctic is an interesting and chalenging area not only geographicaly and politicaly 
but also in a legal sense. To begin with, establishment of Western-style teritorial sovereignty 
over the Arctic land area and its seabed is today highly atractive to many nations as a source 
of minerals of for military purposes. From a narrow legal point of view, international law 
questions concerning mostly territorial claims are at the centre of Arctic issues, like, for 
instance, contesting national claims of sovereignty over the Arctic area. This short article 
does not deal with narowly understood public international law related questions or legal-
political disputes over the Arctic, instead, it asks if there is something we might label as an 
Arctic legal tradition. In order to discuss the possibility of an Arctic legal tradition we need to 
first to look at how Arctic has been and how it can be conceptualised from the viewpoint of 
comparative law. 
 
2. Comparative Law and the Arctic 
Clearly, Arctic contains many sorts of overlapping laws and normativities.19 But 
essentialy, Arctic is certainly not a monolith in any meaningful law related sense. So, what is 
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S. P. Donlan and L. Heckendorn Urscheler, Concepts of Law: An Introduction, [in:] S.P. Donlan and L. 
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the place of the Arctic in comparative law? In the discipline of comparative law various 
large-scale entities have been dealt with by macro-comparison. In macro-comparison whole 
systems (as large-scale normative entities), legal cultures or traditions, which are more 
extensive than legal systems (in a narrow sense), are examined and discussed.20 In the 
mainstream macro-conceptualisations of comparative law, diferent classifications of legal 
systems are presented as part(s?) of comparative law theory with the aim of mastering the 
plurality of the diferent legal systems in terms of knowledge. In other words, the motive is 
mainly epistemic in the sense of systematisation. This way, the aim has been to create a 
general, at least reasonably reliable, simplified panorama of the systems, which are pluralistic 
as to their contents. Notwithstanding, comparative research has usualy concentrated on 
formal legal systems (i.e. systems of positive law), so it comes as no surprise to see that there 
is no Arctic legal family or Arctic legal culture in the same sense as comparative lawyers talk 
about common law, civil law or mixed-law as meaningful macro-constructs. 
The fact that Arctic has been missed by comparative law is, however, not a genuine 
surprise. Al States have legal systems, as do many units that are smaler than States, such as 
cantons and different autonomous teritories. But Arctic is diferent in many senses and not 
only geographicaly. For instance, indigenous peoples have their own legal traditions, which 
are not technicaly similar or as comprehensive as the legal systems of States that 
colonialized them, or other modern communities that corespond to the State (e.g. the 
European Union). Moreover, indigenous traditions do not coincide with State borders, which 
is ilustrated by the Sámi law.21 The Sámi law consists not only of the national norms of the 
Finnish, Swedish, Norwegian and Russian States and the relevant international norms 
concerning the Sámi people, but also – and more crucialy – of the traditional norms that are 
folowed (internaly) in Sámi communities because these rules are felt as binding. 
In principle, Arctic indigenous laws should not pose a problem for macro-comparative 
law; other non-Western normative entities based on, say, customary law have been seen to 
have formed entities that are sensible from the point of view of comparative law as objects of 
legal knowledge. In spite of this general recognition, macro-comparative law has for a long 
time concentrated on the so-caled legal families (common law, civil law, mixed law) that are 
based on the State-centric classification of formal legal systems that originate from the 
                                                                                          
Heckendorn Urscheler (eds.), Concepts of Law: Comparative, Jurisprudential, and Social Science Perspectives, 
Farnham 2014, pp. 1-17. 
20 See J. Husa, A New Introduction to Comparative Law, Oxford 2015, p. 100-104. 
21 See C. Alard and S. Funderud Skogvang, Indigenous Rights in Scandinavia, Farnham 2015. 
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Western law. As a result, the very idea of an Arctic legal culture has been left virtualy 
unnoticed. The reason for this is not hard to grasp. From the view point of modern Western 
comparative lawyer, the laws and normativities of the Arctic peoples are scatered under 
various separate indigenous laws, as for instance, Sámi law or Inuit law. In this way, the grip 
of State-oriented thinking has been but overwhelming i.e. State-oriented thinking, by 
comparatists, has resulted in an Arctic legal tradition not being considered. 
The fact that the Arctic has been left out is surprising because there are many such 
features that justify talking about an Arctic legal tradition. Obviously, the somewhat outdated 
concept of legal family does not seem to work with the Arctic, but the idea of an Arctic legal 
tradition might be worthwhile looking into.22 In efect, if we abandon the epistemic 
framework of Western comparative law and take into account the views of archaeologists and 
anthropologists the macro-comparative picture may look diferent. There are clear reasons to 
change the classical views and understandings which cannot be discussed here.23 The basic 
situation in the Arctic is simple if we leave out the troubles with Western oriented public 
international law and assume a broader, culturaly sensitive point of view on law. Simply put, 
today we know that people have lived in the Arctic for as long as twenty thousand years. 
Such peoples as the Inuit in Canada and Greenland, or the Yu'pik, Iñupiat, and Athabascan in 
Alaska, are examples of traditional ethnic groups that are native to the Arctic. Also the Sámi 
in Nordic countries and Russia belong to this group.24 Al of these groups have certain 
anthropological, historical, and mental similarities because traditionaly, Arctic native 
peoples have lived primarily from hunting, fishing, herding, and gathering wild plants for 
food. And even while much of their traditional worlds that once were are gone today, there 
are stil much Arctic indigenous languages and customs very much alive. But, can we argue 
that there is an Arctic legal tradition? First we need to define what it is that we mean by the 
notion of legal tradition. 
 
 
                             
22 The notion of legal family does not fit here not so much because it is outdated but rather because ‘legal 
family’ is based on kinship. This means that family members ought to have historical connections and, clearly, 
this is missing in the case of Arctic law. On a similar note, see also J. Husa, A New Introduction, p. 228-229, 
discussing the Nordic legal family. 
23 See for more detailed discussion J. Husa, The Future of Legal Families, [in:] Oxford Handbooks Online. 
24 See G. Fondahl, V. Filippova, and L Mack, Indigenous Peoples in the New Arctic, [in:] B. Evengård, J. 
Nymand Larsen, Ø. Paasche, The New Arctic, Berlin 2015, p. 7-22. 
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3. Legal Tradition? 
In comparative law discussions, the concept of a legal tradition has been used in 
diferent contexts for a long time, but from the beginning of the twenty-first century the 
notion has been specificaly connected with a particular comparatist. Legal Traditions of the 
World, by late H. Patrick Glenn, was first published in 2000 and its fifth edition saw daylight 
in 2014.25 Glenn underlined the interaction between diferent traditions, while simultaneously 
eficiently silencing the atraction of relativism, which aims at emphasising the 
distinctiveness of diferent traditions and their incapability of becoming involved in a genuine 
dialogue. The main comparative law message is directed to the preservation of a polyphonic 
legal culture(s) on the globe. Glenn’s argument is a powerful point for diversity and cultural 
pluralism while simultaneously avoiding naïveté or patronage towards non-Western 
traditions.26 
By tradition, Glenn refers to the part of the past that is stil present at this time and has a 
chance of being transmited even further. His notion of a legal tradition emphasises long 
continuity as a significant part of tradition itself. It is a question of the impact of the past and 
of how the past stays alive and reaches the present; pastness is conveyed in the information 
contained in the tradition. To state the obvious, there are crucial diferences between classical 
comparative law approaches and the legal traditions approach.27 The older comparative law 
classifications of legal families and the diferent groupings of legal cultures do not contain 
the dynamic interaction between the macro-constructs that Glenn’s basic idea relies on a 
continuous fashion. That the diferent legal traditions are in interaction with each other, 
means that information (concepts, institutions, solution models, principles etc.) is on the 
move between them.28 Now, much of Glenn’s contribution is particularly useful when we 
discuss the possibility of a specific Arctic legal tradition. 
Glenn distinguished several legal traditions, none of which seems specificaly fit to 
describe the legal tradition of indigenous peoples’ Arctic law. In the terminology used by 
Glenn, this is chthonic law, which is defined as a system of law centred on the sacred 
                             
25 H. Patrick Glenn, Legal Traditions of the World – Sustainable Diversity of Law, Oxford, 2014. 
26 See also J. Husa, A New Introduction, p. 233-236. 
27 It is not argued here that Glenn’s approach would be without flaws. For a critique, see A Fresh Start for 
Comparative Legal Studies? A Colective Review of Patrick Glenn’s Legal Traditions of the World, 2nd Edition, 
“Journal of Comparative Law” 2006, vol. 1, no. 1. 
28 See H. Patrick Glenn, Legal Traditions, ch. 1. 
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character of the cosmos.29 In other words, it is built upon a certain kind of an idea of nature 
and man. In Glenn’s analysis the chthonic legal tradition emerged through experience, orality 
and memory. He regarded this legal tradition as the oldest of al legal traditions. Glenn 
specificaly describes the chthonic legal tradition as a way to live in close harmony with 
earth. However, chthonic law is not an exclusive notion because in a broad sense it can be 
used to describe any legal culture which is a part of the longstanding custom of the people 
and in this sense also distinguishable from the Western oriented definition of law. In essence, 
however, Glenn’s view relies on a specific legal theoretical thinking according to which there 
is no distinct line between legal and non-legal forms of normativity. If this standpoint is 
accepted, then, much of Glenn’s arguments should make perfectly sense. And, of course, in 
the case of the Arctic legal tradition this is imperative because if we do not accept the lack of 
a distinct line between diferent forms of normativity, we cannot realy speak of the Arctic 
legal tradition; without this broad theoretical framework we would be left with just the 
narow Western notions of law and legality. And, it goes without saying that if we accept 
only Western law as law having truly normative power, then, indigenous Arctic traditions are 
not “legal”. But this is clearly way too narow of a standpoint to be upheld in modern 
comparative legal research! 
 
4. Chthonic Arctic Legal Tradition. Conclusions 
Now, if we folow Glenn’s line of argumentation and expand it a bit we may tentatively 
claim that there indeed is an Arctic legal tradition. Undoubtedly, it has some distinguishable 
features. First, as to its nature, it is not Western positive (State) law, as it has emerged 
through long experience, orality and memory of indigenous group. Second, an Arctic legal 
tradition covers the indigenous peoples of the geographical Arctic, who have inhabited this 
area for thousands of years. In other words, it is not the laws or legal systems of Western 
colonizers, nor is it the laws or customs of non-Arctic indigenous peoples.30 Third, an Arctic 
                             
29 See H. Patrick Glenn, Legal Traditions, ch. 3. Originaly the word chthonic refers to earth and has its roots in 
Greek mythology. According to this mythology, there were deities or gods which were related to the 
subterranean underworld i.e. a world where the souls of the dead go. Accordingly, the notion of chthonic comes 
from the Greek χθόνιος (khthónios) which means "of the earth, in the earth”. The basic root of chthonic comes 
from the word χθών (khtón) which means “earth” or “ground”. In short, this notion refers to a certain kind of 
relationship between man and earth. 
30 Of course, other indigenous peoples may be part of the larger chthonic legal tradition but they lack the 
”Northness” which is distinctive for the Arctic indigenous groups. In other words, the Arctic groups’ relation to 
nature is labeled by the Northern conditions (e.g. animals, ice, snow etc.). 
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legal tradition builds especialy on the specific connection to the land (earth) that the 
indigenous peoples have inhabited for very longs periods of time. Fourth, a chthonic Arctic 
legal tradition is intimately connected to indigenous languages and traditional livelihoods 
such as reindeer herding, fishing and hunting. Fifth, a chthonic Arctic legal tradition is in 
danger because of industrialization, social change and environmental issues (e.g. climate 
change). The danger stems from the fact that indigenous normativities are typicaly born out 
of, and upheld together with the basic condition which is derived from the foundational 
relation between human being and their environment (earth), thus, these indigenous 
normativities are essentialy chthonic as to their nature. 
In a deeper legal cultural sense, a chthonic Arctic legal tradition is threatened by the 
tightening grip of Western State laws and their imperialistic embrace. Importantly, the 
growing recognition of indigenous rights and the renaissance of self-governing indigenous 
institutions are paving way to a legal recognition of the value and significance of an Arctic 
indigenous legal tradition. Yet, it is up to us, Western lawyers and legal scholars, to make 
sure that the chthonic Arctic legal voice wil be heard and that it is not suffocated by the al-
encompassing Western, State centred understanding of law. 
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3. 
The Philosophy of Law in Canada’s North 
 
Diana Ginn* 
 
Abstract 
The philosophy of law in Canada’s North is best understood though the metaphor of a 
bridge, exemplified through the recognition of customary aboriginal law, the doctrine of 
aboriginal rights, and the devolution of jurisdiction to teritorial governments, al of which 
reflect a pragmatic, contextual and pluralistic approach to law. 
 
  1. Introduction 
Canada is a federal state, comprised of 10 provinces and three northern teritories 
(Yukon, Northwest Territories and Nunavut). While some portion of each teritory lies south 
of the Arctic Circle, politicaly, socialy and coloquialy, “the North” in Canada is seen as 
encompassing al of the three teritories as wel as northern Quebec and Labrador. The North 
plays a significant role in Canada’s geographic reach and its identity: it encompasses more 
than 40 percent of our land mass and nearly 75 percent of our shoreline;31 and in our national 
anthem, we sing of “the true north strong and free”.32 The population of Canada’s North is 
smal – less than 120,000 people, approximately half of whom are aboriginal (and this 
percentage rises to 80% above the Arctic Circle33). 
The philosophy of law in Canada’s North can best be understood through the 
metaphor of a bridge. This metaphor is explored here in three contexts: recognition of 
aboriginal customary law; resolution of land and self-governance claims through the doctrine 
of aboriginal rights; and devolution of jurisdiction to teritorial governments. The pragmatic, 
contextual and pluralistic approach to law reflected in these three examples has facilitated the 
building of judicial, legislative and constitutional bridges between systems of law, between 
aboriginal occupancy and Crown sovereignty, and across a spectrum of governance models. 
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  2. Recognition of aboriginal customary law 
Britain’s acquisition of North America was premised on the continued existence of 
aboriginal laws and governmental structures, except to the extent these were lawfuly 
extinguished or were incompatible with Crown sovereignty and underlying Crown title.34 
This concept of continuity found expression in a number of cases upholding “custom” 
mariages and adoptions. The earliest known case occured in 1854, where the court validated 
a mariage solemnized in accordance with aboriginal law.35 Custom mariages have also been 
upheld more recently36 as have custom adoptions,37 including where the adopting parent was 
of European descent but had become part of the aboriginal community.38 Custom adoptions 
now have statutory recognition in the Northwest Teritories and Nunavut.39 This legal 
pluralism operates as a bridge between two communities and two legal systems, offering a 
flexible and pragmatic recognition of existing familial relationships. 
 
  3. Aboriginal rights: land and self-governance claims 
While aboriginal peoples in Canada’s North had some early contact with traders, 
whalers, prospectors and missionaries, they remained largely undisturbed until the early 
1970s. In 1968, oil and gas were discovered in Alaska, and by 1975, there were various 
proposals for pipelines running through the western Arctic. Although the pipelines were put 
on hold, it became evident that development planned for the North could threaten traditional 
lifestyles that had remained largely viable until then. One response to the prospect of 
increased development was the initiation of aboriginal land claims, including an atempt in 
1973 to lodge a caveat against title to almost half of the Northwest Teritories.40 While the 
application was ultimately unsuccessful, that same year, the Supreme Court of Canada 
recognized the doctrine of aboriginal title, based on historic use and occupancy, and not 
dependent on any grant from or treaty with the Crown.41 
                             
34 B. Slatery, The Hidden Constitution, Am. J. Comp. Law 1984 vol. 32, p. 366. 
35 Tranchemonteque v. Momtefeand et al, referred to in B. Morse, Native people and the Resolution of Family 
Maters (LLM Thesis) York University 1981 at p. 45. 
36 Re Noah Estate (1961), 32 D.L.R. (2d) 185. 
37 Re Katie’s Adoption Petition (1961) 38 W.W.R. 100; Re Beaulieu’s Petition (1969), 3 D.L.R. (3d) 479; Re 
Deborah E-789 [1972] 5 W.W.E. 203. 
38 Re Washee [1967] 57 D.L.R. (d) 743; Re Tagornak Adoption Petition (1984) 1 C.N.L.R. 185. 
39 Aboriginal Custom Adoption Recognition Act, SNWT (Nu) 1994, c 26. 
40 History of the Dene Nation, available at htp:/www.denenation.ca/history (28.02.2016). 
41 Calder et al. v. Atorney-General of British Columbia, [1973] S.C.R. 313. 
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The connection between aboriginal title to land and some form of jurisdiction over 
those lands soon became evident. Two early land claims setled in Canada’s North - the 
James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement (1975) and the Northeastern Quebec Agreement 
(1978) - recognized aboriginal control over land and resources, with the later described as 
“the first Aboriginal self-government model in Canada”.42 Similarly, a 1984 agreement 
between the federal government and the Inuvialuit of the western Arctic contained self-
governance elements as did four agreements signed in the Yukon in 1993, which recognized 
significant aboriginal control over internal administrative maters, and legislative authority 
over maters of a “local or private nature” within the area covered by the agreements.43 
Nunavut (formerly part of the Northwest Teritories) was formed through the Nunavut Land 
Claims Agreement, signed in 1999, with self-government being exercised through a public 
government representing a majority Aboriginal and minority non-Aboriginal population. 
While the resolution of land and self-governance claims has occured primarily 
through negotiated setlements, the legal parameters of those negotiations are found in 
Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence on aboriginal rights, particularly since 1982 when, as 
part of the patriation of the Canadian constitution, aboriginal rights were given constitutional 
protection.44 The doctrine of aboriginal rights has been described by the Court as a “bridging 
of aboriginal and non-aboriginal cultures”,45 which is “aimed at the reconciliation of the 
prior occupation of North America by distinctive aboriginal societies with the assertion of 
Crown sovereignty over Canadian territory”.46 One Supreme Court justice ended his 
landmark description of aboriginal title with the words, “Let us face it, we are al here to 
stay.”47 
 
  4. Devolution of jurisdiction to territorial governments 
The federal and provincial governments in Canada exercise inherent jurisdiction, 
enshrined in the constitution. While the teritories do not enjoy constitutionaly-protected 
jurisdiction, in al three there has been significant devolution of legislative and administrative 
                             
42 Y. D. Belanger, ed., Aboriginal Self-Government in Canada: Current Trends & Issues, 3d ed. (Saskatoon, 
Purich Publishing, Ltd.) 2008 at p. 11. 
43 M. Whitington, Aboriginal Self-Government in Canada in M. Whitington & G. Wiliams (eds.) Canadian 
Politics in the 1990s, 4th ed. (Toronto: Nelson) 1994 at p. 14. 
44 Section 35, Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11. 
45 R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 50, para 43. 
46 Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, para 81. 
47 Ibidem, para 186. 
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authority from the federal government.48 On a conventional account, this authority could be 
revoked simply by repealing the relevant federal legislation; however, some political 
scientists argue that unwriten constitutional conventions would prevent the federal 
government from dismantling or eviscerating territorial governments.49 Thus, devolution too 
has acted as a bridge, alowing teritorial governments to move along the continuum from 
purely subordinate entities exercising powers at the goodwil of the federal government, to 
entities that exercise authority and occupy a position far closer to that of provinces. 
Devolution has happened over several decades and at a diferent pace in each of the 
teritories, thus alowing a contextualized response to the conditions and realities in each 
teritory. 
 
  5. Conclusion 
  Using the metaphor of a bridge is not intended to portray an unrealisticaly rosy 
picture of the Canadian North: there is stil a great deal of work to be done in building healthy 
communities, as is evident from high levels of ilness, addictions, poverty and suicide, and in 
promoting sustainable economic development while respecting traditional ways of life. 
Recognition of customary aboriginal family, the setlement of land and self-governance 
claims, and the devolution of legislative and administrative authority to teritorial 
governments are not panaceas; for instance, some would argue that the autonomy of 
aboriginal child welfare agencies is stil limited or that the degree of aboriginal self-
government recognized thus far is inadequate.50 However, by providing a bridge between 
diferent legal systems, between aboriginal use and occupation of the lands and the assertion 
of Crown sovereignty, and between more and less autonomous models of government, each 
of these has played some role in ofering pragmatic, contextual and pluralistic responses to 
the chalenges and conundrums of the Canadian North. 
 
                             
48 Yukon Devolution, available at htps:/www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1352470994098/1352471080537; 
Northwest  Territories  Devolution, available at  htps:/www.aadnc-
aandc.gc.ca/eng/1352398433161/1352400493640; Nunavut Devolution, available at htps:/www.aadnc-
aandc.gc.ca/eng/1352471770723/1352471861365 (28.02.2106). 
49 See for example: K. Cameron & G. White, Northern Governments in Transition: Political and Constitutional 
Development in the Yukon, Nunavut and the Western Northwest Territories (Montreal: Institute for Research on 
Public Policy) 1995 at p. 118. 
50 J. E. Dalton, Aboriginal Title and Self-Government in Canada: What is the True Scope of Comprehensive 
Land Claims Agreements? W.R.L.S (2006) Vol. 22, pp. 29-78. 
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4. 
The Arctic as Common Good 
 
Ko Hasegawa* 
 
Abstract 
The paper is to sketch a problem framework for reflecting the moral nature of the Arctic as 
common good that would be significant for further practical considerations on various Arctic 
issues. 
 
  1. Introduction 
  As a fundamental problem of the philosophy of law in the Arctic, it is significant how 
we could grasp the moral nature of the Arctic. In particular, the idea of common good in the 
Arctic looks much relevant when we see many political, legal, or economic issues concerning 
the Arctic. In this brief exploration, I try to sketch a problem framework for reflecting the 
moral nature of the Arctic as common good that would be significant for further practical 
considerations on various Arctic issues. 
 
  2. Introductory Remarks――The Significance of the Idea of Common Good for 
the Arctic 
Should the region of the Arctic be shared by al the relevant societies and peoples, or be 
appropriated severaly by each of those societies and peoples? This is the fundamental issue 
for the preservation and utilization of various conditions and resources in the Arctic. If to be 
shared by al, there must be significant constraints to the utilization of the Arctic; if to be 
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appropriated severaly, there must be significant freedom in the preservation of the Arctic. 
The way of thinking in this regard is theoreticaly contrasting and practicaly conflicting, 
whether politicaly, economicaly, socialy or moraly. Which is beter, or are there any other 
possibilities? And, how is the Arctic law to be related to those thinkings? ――These are the 
problems for philosophy of law in the Arctic. 
To tackle with these problems, we need beware that there are two diferent basic 
problems which gets entangled with each other: conceptual and empirical problems. The 
former is the problem that concerns the conditions and features of relevant concepts such as 
common good or property in discussing about the Arctic issues; the later is the problem that 
concerns the identification and instantiation of relevant facts to the concept in question such 
as the alocation of land or sea rights in discussing about those issues. And these problems get 
entangled in the sense that the conceptual conditions and features are prerequisites to the 
recognition of empirical maters, while the empirical identification and instantiation are the 
maters of conceptual application. We have to heed to this twofold problem situation, 
especialy when we wish to focus on the idea of common good for the Arctic.    
The idea of common good indicates, in my view, the holistic condition for al human 
beings in a society, as wel as the idea of global common good for al the peoples on this 
globe. For example, it is evident that clean air is an invaluable life condition for al the people 
in a society, as wel as for al the peoples on this globe51. This means not simply that clean air 
is non-exclusionarily sharable but rather that anyone in society cannot live wel at al without 
that condition52. Even if clean air is given in some artificial way, the fundamentality of the 
condition is the same. Thus we may say that clean air is a (natural) common good. On the 
global level, we can also say that al the peoples on this globe must need this sort of common 
good in some universal way. Common good is the good that is invaluably basic for any 
individuals, classes, groups, or communities of divergent people in society, without regard to 
their political, economic, or cultural variations. 
Yet, what sort of particular good(s) should be regarded as invaluably basic for the 
fundamental conditions of human life without which human beings cannot subsist and act 
wel at al? The important question here is concerned not simply with the non-exclusionarily 
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sharable use but rather with the basicness of that good for the subsistence and activities for al 
the people(s) concerned. To understand this significance of common good, we need some 
theory of boundary conditions of it, namely conceptual conditions and features of common 
good, including some paradigmatic instances. Stil, to add, while it could be easier to think 
about that possibility as for natural and economic good, it could be more dificult to think 
about commonality or universality as for cultural and societal good. 
In this short essay, there are few rooms for more explications. However, needless to say, 
we have to distinguish the concepts of common good, colective goods, public goods and the 
like53. These various communal good(s) are the good(s) to be co-utilized by anyone in society 
in some practical way. Stil, common good indicates the very necessity of communal hold for 
the intrinsic and essential basis of human lives.  
   
  3.  Problems  of the  Arctic  as  Common  Good 
  Now, for the idea of the Arctic as common good, central problems are concerned with 
the conceptual one as I have distinguished above; which may include several sub-problems 
necessary to address. They are the problem of circumstance, the problem of distribution, and 
the problem of participation, as I cal them, as wel as the problem that is the common thread 
of them, namely the problem of communality. 
  The first problem is concerned with the possibility of the recognition of common 
good: how can some good or goods be grasped as invaluably common? The second is 
concerned with the standards of distribution or redistribution of common good among the 
relevant peoples, organizations, or states around the Arctic: how can common good be shared 
equaly among relevant societal units? The third is concerned with the conditions of human 
decision-making for the efective use of common good: how can the relevant units around the 
region in question decide the administrative issues on the common good in question in a fair 
way? And the fourth is concerned with the prerequisites of the three problems explicated so 
far: how the circumstance, distribution, and participation concerning common good can be 
relevantly common among the relevant units in the region in question? This last problem is 
ultimately important because the former three problems presuppose some positive answer to 
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this last problem: if those former problems be not given some positively communal 
characteristics, there would not arise those problems regarding common good. 
In particular, the first and the last problem is the vital one for considering whether the 
Arctic, or some important aspect of the Arctic, can be a common good, and, if so, in what 
sense and for whom. For example, can the legal issues concerning the Arctic today, such as, 
naturaly, the preservation of climate conditions, the acquisition and use of natural resources 
in the Arctic, the cooperative use of sky, sea and land for transportation, or socialy, the rights 
of indigenous peoples in the Arctic with each other and against other people and 
organizations from different areas, the relationship between the necessity of economic 
development and the maintenance of traditional ways of life, and the communicative 
exchanges of divergent cultures in the region, be identified as that sort of common good? 
Here the problem is twofold: one is concerned with the possibility of the Arctic resources as 
common good for the peoples concerned, and the other is with the possibility of the concept 
of common good in the Arctic itself. And the direction of possible responses to the particular 
issues mentioned above is determined by the positive or negative answers to these problems. 
If we can think positively about these two problems, we wil have a positive view for the 
Arctic as common good, and vice versa. 
 Also, for example, how to arange the cooperative use of sky, sea and land for 
transportation among relevant societies and peoples is a distributive question concerning the 
privilege and burden for that common good. Is the privilege and burden of the Arctic sky, sea 
or land for transportation to be absolutely equalized among relevant societies and peoples, or 
to be distributed unevenly and proportionately? And it includes a participatory question 
concerning common good, in this context, how the scope and extent of those privileges and 
burdens should be decided, by democratic voting or under some deliberative procedure 
among relevant societies and peoples.  
Incidentaly, we should not forget al these points lead to another problem of the so-
caled common capital in society54. The problems mentioned so far include institutional 
aspects which concern the infra-structure of adequate human dealing of common good. For 
example, the problem of distribution includes the problem of the institutional framework for 
the realization and maintenance of distributive justice. Also, the problem of participation 
includes the problem of the institutional framework for participation such as the system of 
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rights and voting. These frameworks are derivations from the idea of common good; in other 
words, those are socialy common capital for the realization of common good, the 
constitutive one of which is law. We have to explore how this capital is to be shaped properly 
in the political, economic, or social determination of common good, and, especialy for the 
philosophy of law in the Arctic, how the proper role is to be given to law in the setings in 
question. 
Meanwhile, there are purely empirical problems as wel. Assuming that the significance 
of the concept of common good is explicated in a proper way in responding to al those 
questions I have touched in this section, how to empiricaly identify and instantiate such 
common good is itself an significant problem55. Stil, I wil leave this problem to relevant 
empirical discussions. 
  
  4. A Future Perspective for the Arctic as Common Good 
  Al the problems I have pointed out in this overview are philosophicaly deep and 
practicaly complex, which requires deep reflections. It is hasty for us to advocate some 
particular positions to those problems without such reflections. And this is why we need the 
exploration of the philosophy of law in the Arctic. 
  To note at this moment, the folowing issues may be important especialy from the 
viewpoint of common good in the Arctic ―― whether and to what extent natural resources 
and conditions in the Arctic are to be preserved for the stable natural environment in the 
region and on this globe; whether and to what extent the important species should be 
protected and preserved for the maintenance of the bio-diversity in this region; whether and 
to what extent the Arctic is to be geographicaly aranged to share by the societies or peoples 
concerned and thereby important resources are to be explored for the common or universal 
interests of the peoples in this region or on this globe; whether and to what extent the 
interests of minority peoples in the Arctic, whose livings are endangered by capitalistic 
globalization and other private exploitations from the advanced parts of the world, should be 
respected in harmony with relevant global considerations56. 
                             
55 For example, to identify the importance of clean air as common good, we have to observe and grasp the 
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56 Cf. Leif Christian Jensen & Geir Hoenneland, eds., Handbook of the Politics of the Arctic, Edward Elger 
Publication, 2015 
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Not only whether one should answer to these issues afirmatively or negatively but also 
how one could answer to these issues properly are significant problems for the philosophy of 
law in the Arctic as common good. To answer these problems, we have to consider what 
elements we should appreciate as fundamentaly common in accessing, utilizing, and 
preserving those various goods in the Arctic via a legal perspective on the Arctic as common 
good. And, we should note in the end, the exploration of the Arctic as common good is 
ultimately a cosmological problem on the very meaning of life for human beings in that vast 
region in determining the communality of the common good in question57. 
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5. 
Legal Pluralisms 
 
Karol Dobrzeniecki 
 
Abstract 
“Legal pluralism” may denote various things in very various contexts. Its popularity in 
contemporary socio-legal debate sometimes additionaly impedes the accurate understanding. 
 
1. Introduction 
An issue that requires careful consideration, always when writing about legal 
pluralism, is an adequate and conscious usage of the term58. “Legal pluralism” may denote 
various things in very various contexts. Its popularity in contemporary socio-legal debate 
sometimes  additionaly impedes the accurate understanding. Different meanings are 
confused by polysemy. In my opinion legal pluralism cannot be confined solely to – as a 
popular definition says - “the idea that in any one geographical space, there is more than one 
law or legal system”59. Each plane of legal research (linguistic or analytical, psychological, 
sociological and axiological) ofers a diferent view on legal pluralism. Below I would like 
to sketch exemplary usages of the term. 
 
2. Exemplary usages of the term "legal pluralism" 
Analytical approach concentrates on the logical structure of law, the meanings 
and uses of its concepts, and the formal terms and the modes of its operation. Legal 
pluralism, from this perspective, was described by Nick Barber. In his view, a single legal 
system can contain multiple rules of recognition60 that leads to the system with unranked 
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through the application of the rule of recognition constituted a single legal system.  
40 
 
legal sources. This kind of inconsistency cannot be resolved within the legal system because 
of the lack of legal mechanisms which could be used for such purpose. In analytical approach 
to legal pluralism, it is assumed that there is no higher constitutional body that can resolve 
such kind of  dispute through adjudication or legislation. “Consequently, pluralist legal 
systems contain a risk, which need not be realised, of constitutional crisis; of oficials being 
compeled to choose between their loyalties to diferent public institutions.”61 For Barber, 
pluralist model of a legal system requires both multiple sources of law, and, also, the 
possibility of inconsistency between legal rules62. Systems with inconsistent rules of 
recognition existed not only as theoretical constructs. Pluralist legal orders in this sense 
occured e.g. during Rhodesian crisis of 1965. The concept might also be applied for 
explanation of the relations between European and domestic legal orders. 
The founder and the most prominent representative of the legal psychologism was 
Leon Petrażycki (1867 – 1931). His concept consists in treating of al legal phenomena as a 
mere subclass of ethical ones63. The basis for the theory was a concept of emotion, especialy 
ethical emotion regarded as an inward impediment to individual freedom. These 
psychological phenomena comprise both passive experiences (feelings) and a drive toward a 
certain action.  According to Petrażycki, if a man is facing the possibility of commiting an 
ethicaly wrong act, it wil evoke in him repulsive emotions that reject such an act. Ethical 
appulsions, on the contrary, usualy cause proper behaviour, like paying debts or helping the 
poors etc.64 Experiencing ethical emotion is a condition for every ethical act.  Such 
observation leads Petrażycki to conclusion that, in fact, al ethical and legal phenomena are 
purely and exclusively individual phenomena and the consent and approval on the part of 
others, if any,  are irelevant from the point of view of defining and studying their nature65. 
Ethical and moral phenomena difer in the aspect of reference to others. Obligations as to 
which nothing appertains are moral obligations. Ones which are felt as unfree with reference 
to others should be termed legal obligations66. 
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Important for the discussed issue of legal pluralism is Petrażycki’s distinction 
between oficial and unoficial law. Official imperative-atributive phenomena are made up 
by what state oficials actualy experience in their capacity of public-legal authorities67. 
Unoficial law (e.g. system of norms governing the life of any family) does not possess this 
significance in the state68. From the theoretical point of view there are no essential 
diferences between them. Positive law are rules refering to any kind of normative fact, 
which could be official (as statutes, administrative decisions), as wel as unoficial (command 
of a leader) or may have only psychic nature. It refers to anything that is refered to by an 
agent as the source of the norm69. Petrażycki’s definition of law covers each imperative-
atributive phenomenon anywhere and anytime70. Capacity to experience such kind of 
feelings is not limited to humans, but covers also other kind of beings, even animals and 
plants. 
Legal pluralism moved to centre stage in socio-legal studies in the late 1980s. 
Many anthropologists and sociologists adopted the concept of law set forth by John Grifiths, 
in the article “What is Legal Pluralism?” from 1986. He distinguished a nonuniformity of law 
(when more than one role is applicable to the same situation) from legal pluralism. The later 
must be not normative but empirical, being an atribute of a social field, not of a legal system. 
Legal pluralism is a concomitant of social pluralism. “It is when in a social field more than 
one source of ‘law”, more than one ‘legal order’, is observable, that the social order of that 
field can be said to exhibit legal pluralism.”71 Grifiths applies Saly Falk Moore’s concept of 
the ‘semi-autonomous social field’. He argues that law is present in every such field, and 
“since every society contains many such fields, legal pluralism is a universal feature of social 
organization.”72 He argues that there are many rule-generating fields in society, hence there 
are many legal orders in society, including the family, corporations, factories, sports leagues, 
and indeed just about any social area with social regulation 
Similar phenomena are taking place at the supranational level. As another 
sociologist, Günther Teubner noticed: wherever autonomous social sectors develop, at the 
same time autonomous law is produced, in relative distance from politics. World society is 
coming about not under the leadership of international politics, nor can it be equated with 
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economic globalisation. “Instead, globalisation is a polycentric process in which 
simultaneously differing areas of life break through their regional bounds and each 
constitutes autonomous global sectors for themselves.”73 Law-making takes place outside the 
classical sources of international law, e.g. in agreements between global players, in private 
market regulation by multinational concerns, internal regulations of international 
organisations, interorganisational negotiating systems, world-wide standardisation processes, 
etc.74 
 
3. Iusnaturalism 
An example of a legal research on axiological plane is iusnaturalism. In this 
context legal pluralism might be understood as co-existence of different kinds of law, not in 
psychological or sociological but in metaphysical sense. Aquinas recognized four main kinds 
of law: the eternal, the natural, the human, and the divine. The eternal law is “the type of 
divine wisdom, as directing al actions and movements”. The natural law is eternal law as it 
applies to people; it is “promulgated by the very fact that God instiled it into men's minds so 
as to be known by them naturaly". The divine law is the revealed word of God. The human 
law is created by men and its aim (telos), according to Aquinas, is the common good. The 
human law is “an ordinance of reason for the common good, made by him who has care of 
the community.”75 Aquinas’s definition of law requires that there should be an authority in 
political communities, translating certain principles of natural law into positive law and 
reinforcing these principles with legal sanctions. Justified authorities derive the positive law 
they make from the natural law or, equivalently, translate natural law principles of justice and 
political morality into the rules of positive law76. 
Positive law may be derived from the natural law in two ways. First, as a 
conclusion from premises, secondly, by way of determination of certain generalities. Some 
things are therefore derived from the general principles of the natural law, by way of 
conclusions. For example, that "one must not kil" may be derived as a conclusion from the 
principle that "one should do harm to no man". But some are derived there from by way of 
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determination. For example, the law of nature has it that the evil-doer should be punished. 
But that he be punished in this or that way is a determination of the law of nature77. Those 
things, which are derived from the law of nature by way of particular determination, belong 
to the civil law, as each state decides on what is best for itself78. Accordingly, both modes of 
derivation are found in the human law. Those things, which are derived in the first way, are 
contained in human law not as emanating from that place exclusively, but have some force 
from the natural law also. Aquinas says that laws whose derivation from natural law is of this 
second type have their force 'from human law alone' (ex sola lege humana vigorem habent)79. 
Iusnaturalism is considered as having double or triple character. Besides positive 
and natural laws, L. L. Valauri distinguished also “free law”80. Because of this fact, 
iusnaturalism is often considered as “ontological pluralism of law”81. 
 
  4. Conclusion 
Legal pluralists reject narow-minded perspective of traditional, positivistic and state-centred 
legal theory. They look for a diferent paradigm, which would recognize the plurality of law. 
The atitude should be praised as long as the pluralistic approach is used consciously and 
precisely, in order to explain legal issues at this research plane in which legal discourse is 
conducted. 
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Arctic Cosmologies, Beliefs, Art and Shamanism 
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6. 
Customary Laws and Nomadic Cosmologies of Art and the Environment 
 
Patrick Dilon 
 
Abstract 
This paper offers a brief overview of some connections between art, environment and 
nomadic cosmologies, and relates these to maters concerned with customary laws. The 
connections are made in a cultural ecological framework which emphasises the transactional 
basis of how people engage with their environments. Whereas art has always been an integral 
part of nomadic cosmologies, it now has additional roles in recording customs and traditions 
and in political and ecological critique. 
 
1. Introduction 
 In 1996, John D. Barow, a professor of astronomy, wrote The Artful Universe, in 
which he made connections between human aesthetic appreciation and the basic nature of the 
cosmos. His thesis is that the adaptive behaviour of people in the environments they inhabit 
has, over many generations, laid foundations for sensitivities and subjective responses which, 
in turn, are manifest in their works of ornamentation and art. 
  Twenty years later, some of Barrow’s ideas look a litle reductionist, but new insights 
from across the disciplines have added weight to arguments about human aesthetics and 
environments. My own discipline is cultural ecology which is concerned with the flux of 
transactions that characterise how people interact with their environments. In this paper, I 
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would like to sketch out some connections within a particular cultural ecological 
configuration, that of art, environment and nomadic cosmologies, and relate these to maters 
concerned with customary laws. Space permits only the briefest of outlines, a more detailed 
cultural ecological framing of customary laws can be found in Bunikowski & Dilon (2016) 
and of art and craft in Dilon (2016).  
 
2. Cosmology, nomadism, and customary laws 
  The general argument is that cosmology is a form of universal or divine law which 
becomes internalised as beliefs and values, and these, in turn, are expressed within a 
community as customary laws. Customary laws are primarily reflected in people’s behaviour 
within an environment, but they can also be given form and meaning through art. Here I use 
the term ‘art’ broadly as the application of creative skil and imagination, typicaly in visual 
form, producing works that are appreciated for their beauty and, more importantly in the 
context of this paper, for their symbolic, emotional and spiritual significance. This definition 
encompasses the crafting and ornamentation of tools and artefacts that are an integral part of 
nomadic ways of living. 
  Nomadism refers to a lifestyle where people move from place to place, taking their 
possessions with them, and making a living from the resources of the environment 
immediately to hand. Few people now are wholy nomadic, so the term is taken to include 
pastoral groups who move periodicaly on hunting expeditions, to manage their livestock, or 
to exploit seasonal resources (Ingold, 2008). Nomadism, so defined, is an important 
component of the lifestyles of the indigenous peoples of the Arctic. 
  Cultural ecology does not romanticise nomadism, nor does it see it as representing 
something ‘diferent’ or ‘other’. Rather it conceptualises nomadism as a lifestyle lying at one 
end of a continuum of possible engagements between people and their environments. The 
nomadic end of the continuum is characterised by transactions between people and the 
primary resources (landscapes, plants, animals) of the environments concerned, and the 
lifestyles and values associated with living of those resources. Urban living, with high 
energy demands, consumption of secondary (manufactured) goods and dependence on the 
provision of services, is at the other end of the continuum. 
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  The customary laws of nomadic people have developed over centuries of adaptation 
through the people having to respond to the immediate opportunities and chalenges of the 
environments through which they travel and in which they live. These laws are part of 
cosmologies: customary rules that come from traditions based on common, long-standing 
beliefs and understandings of the world and of the universe. They work on the principle of 
reciprocity: a constelation of mutual relationships, obligations and duties among people in a 
given community interlinked with ‘being in’ the social and ecological milieu. They recognise 
and acknowledge the bigger picture but at the same time seek an accommodation that reflects 
a temporaly dependent dynamic between site, location, place and space. Mustonen and 
Lehtinen (2013) put it like this: “.. an appreciation of the continuity of cultural routines that 
constitute the indigenous practices of ethical and spiritual co-being between humans and 
natural systems”. Customary laws are the basis of social order and may or may not be 
consistent with state laws. 
  Customary laws are manifestations of cultural ecologies in the sense that the 
transactions are shaped by, and are expressions of, social norms, economic conditions, 
material resources, means of exchange, institutional structures, knowledge, skils, beliefs, 
values, atitudes, tastes, needs, wants, paterns of production and consumption and so on. This 
means that ‘environment' is more than just physical suroundings and economic activities. It 
includes social relations and the colective capabilities of al the people who inhabit it. 
Artistic production is an important part of this mix. 
 
3. Art and craft in the customary laws of nomadic people 
  Whereas it is self-evident that art is an expression of behaviour, it folows from the 
arguments made above that, when viewed as cultural ecology, art cannot be understood as 
separate from the behaviour of the people who produce it, nor from the environmental 
context in which it is produced. Al are intricately connected. Thus a ‘songline’ (Chatwin, 
1987), meaning a track across the landscape, often with ancestral associations, that is 
established and maintained though stories, songs, dances and painting, is art in its most 
culturaly integrated form. This is art that is both embodied and expressed, what Vuojala-
Magga (2016), a Finnish anthropologist and reindeer herder who spends a large part of her 
life in wilderness, describes as sensory experience interacting with the afordances of the 
environment. 
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  The closer one’s lifestyle is to the environment, the more intimately is the art a part of 
it, and the more dificult it is for outsiders to understand the depth and nuances of its 
ecological, social and cultural meanings. Kivikäs (2005, 8) makes the point, when talking 
about the chalenge of engaging with Finnish rock art: 
“The paintings live in symbiosis with the surounding environment and are 
continuously changing.. works of rock art look diferent in diferent kinds of lighting 
and weather. Before they wil ‘speak’ to you, however, you must have encountered 
them several times, have certain basic knowledge, and be prepared to approach them 
without preconceptions and learned ideas about figurative art. Once a painting site 
and the paintings themselves touch your soul, you wil form a lifelong tie and 
friendship with rock paintings and the natural environment that surounds them.” 
  So also with customary laws; one has to put aside preconceptions and acknowledge 
them for their intrinsic value, to trust that they have meanings and relevance for those whose 
lives they touch, and accept that such laws wil not always align with the thinking of people 
who are outside them, and with the generalised, relational rules that govern the wider society. 
  These arguments recognise no hard distinction between art and craft, and between 
functionality and decoration. In Northern Europe, for example, everyday items made by Sámi 
people are typicaly smal and unpretentious, made with great care and with very particular 
ornamentation (Linkola, 2002, 168). Visual symbols and imagery play an important role in 
Sámi communities. Imagery is, according to Lehtola (2004, 118,) a language of its own in 
which many meanings may be found, each of which may be folowed as its own story. 
According to Philips (2015), art in it most fundamental form comprises ornamentation of 
functional objects: “[the] syntactical elements (stripe, hatching, dot) that are al paraphrases 
of nature”, which once divorced from nature become abstractions. As Valkeapaa (cited in 
Franceschi et al., 2001, 61) observes: “.. although the Sámi had no art as a distinct 
phenomenon, at the same time everything was art for the Sámi, and al Sámi were artists.. it 
was part of life.. and life was a special kind of perpetual art.” 
  Al the while nomadic lifestyles persist, so too does ‘life as perpetual art’ where it has 
a role to play in customary laws. Here art and craft are deeply rooted in traditions, oral 
stories, colective memories and cosmologies. These frameworks for how to act and how to 
do things constitute unwriten codes of conduct passed on from generation by generation. 
Ways of living, customs, art, and laws are inseparable. The art is an integral part of lived 
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experience, celebrated through handicraft, performance and oral tradition; it does not sit 
comfortably with the consumer view of art as commodity which dominates industrialised 
societies. Art as a static presence on the wal of a galery is a long way from life as perpetual 
art; they have very diferent cultural ecological contexts. 
 
4. Changing relationships between art and craft and customary laws 
  However, as nomadism is increasingly compromised by the economic dominance of 
urban ways of living, its art can take on additional functions: the interelated processes of 
recording tradition, renewing ancient stories, and political and ecological critique. As Lehtola 
(2004, 118) observes, its production is often triggered by a trauma that highlights conflict 
between a person’s background and new influences, especialy those that damage the 
environment or conflict with the nomadic way of life. 
  Consider the work of two Arctic artists who were born in the 1930s and have lived 
through a period of profound change. Ruth Annaqtuusi Tulurialik is from the smal island in 
the Kazan River, 200 miles West of Hudson Bay. She says her coloured pencil drawings are 
like Qikaaluktut – the sounds of people passing by outside the iglu, heard but not seen. The 
drawings are there to talk to the viewer directly, to tel the story of Ruth’s people, to 
acknowledge a way of life that is changing so fast because, as Ruth notes, “even my own 
children don’t know how we lived when I was young.” Thomas Frederiksen is from 
Igíniarfik, on the south western coast of Greenland. He says: 
 “Art was very much a part of daily life; the decoration of household articles and 
hunting equipment, the carving of sculptures, paterns in clothing and the decoration 
of the women’s leatherwork al added pleasure to everyday living”. 
  Thomas’s art celebrates especialy hunting and how it was governed by unwriten 
laws. 
  Andreas Alariesto (1900-1989) was an artist and storyteler from North Calote. His 
genre paintings record historical and mythological elements of nomadism as a functional 
economic system. Hautala-Hirvioja (2009, 21) observes: 
“Through his paintings, Alariesto recaled and recreated the past. Art, life and story 
are intertwined. The story, whether painted or told, is not significant only to the 
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author, but also for the whole community. Memories depicted in the paintings help 
people understand life and past conflicts. They analyze emotions by depicting and 
dealing with emotions and memories.” 
 
5. Conclusions 
  Art continues to have an important role in the cosmologies of nomadic people in the 
Arctic, but its interelationships with other elements of their cultural ecologies is constantly 
changing and adapting. ‘Life as perpetual art’ is now complemented by art as recording 
tradition and art as political and ecological critique. Contemporary artists have bought in new 
images based on humour and irony, and new ways of working with colour and composition 
(Lehtola, 2004, 121). Others have introduced new materials or transferred ideas between 
diferent media. But the connectedness of people and nature is ever present, positioning art as 
a powerful advocate for the environment and for sustainable living. This is artistic practice 
adapting within the cultural ecology. It is a means by which people can engage in decisions 
about how their traditions are represented, and how the resources and afordances of the 
environment might be engaged with so that they serve the common good localy. It bridges 
between the oral and enacted modes of customary laws and the writen statutes of state laws. 
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7. 
Sámi Shamanism Past and Present and the Desecration of the Sacred in Finland 
 
Francis Joy 
 
Abstract 
The aim of the paper is to outline a number of prospective legal issues in relation to Sámi 
shamanism and culture within a discussion about Sámi cultural heritage. 
 
1. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to outline a number of prospective legal issues in relation 
to Sámi shamanism and culture within a discussion about Sámi cultural heritage. In order to 
facilitate such a task, it is essential to understand the nature of the background issues which 
contribute to this debate. These are presented to you below. 
Since the melting of the ice caps at the end of the last Ice Age across Fennoscandia 
10,000 years ago and the formulation and migration of human populates within these vast 
areas, today in the north, we encounter through the study of prehistory, traces of the legacies 
they have left behind. The search for human setlement areas across the landscapes has 
revealed how both groups and individual artists and story-telers have emerged from what 
developed into ancient hunting, fishing and trapping civilizations. These persons, one could 
say on reflection, and who shared a polytheistic worldview of life, which was animated, have 
been tradition bearers and cultural custodians who have caried the responsibility, customs, 
and identities of their societies forward into modern times. 
For example, throughout the Nordic countries and also the Kola Peninsula in Russia 
where the indigenous Sámi people live, and who are the descendants of early civilizations. 
These peoples share a unique feature in the ways their cyclical cosmos and worldview, social 
life, customs, religious practices and relationship with nature and the animal kingdom has 
been portrayed through art. Such activities are predominantly characterised within hunting, 
trapping, fishing and reindeer herding narratives. 
                             
 Researcher and PhD candidate Francis Joy (Finland; University of Lapland, Arctic Centre), 
francis.joy@ulapland.fi (Originaly from England.) 
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Although we have no evidence of who the actual persons were that created the 
prehistoric landscape art; namely rock carvings and paintings, the content of their work 
shows overwhelmingly how they have been ritual specialists and people with extraordinary 
skils and abilities and who made contact with unseen worlds and the spirits who dwel there. 
Today, we find many aspects of such practices which have largely continued until the 
17th and 18th centuries portrayed on 71 Sámi shaman drums which were colected by priests 
and missionary workers whose campaign began sometime during the 13th century in the 
Nordic countries, to convert the Sámi populations from their pre-Christian religion to 
Christianity82. 
The Sámi shaman drum can be described as an oval shaped instrument which was a 
representation of between 2-5 layers of the cosmos depicting the human, spirit and animal 
powers that dweled in the diferent dimensions within such landscapes. As a magical 
instrument, the painted drum has also been decorated with solar and lunar symbols as wel as 
spirits representing the diferent elements within the natural world, thus paying reverence to 
them and their divine nature. A receptacle as such, could be compared to a sacred vessel into 
which powerful ancestral spirits and the spirits of nature took up residence and were 
subsequently caled upon by the shaman when he needed assistance in maters pertaining to 
healing, divination and fortune-teling, for example. In this sense the shaman acted as an 
intermediary between the people and spirits. 
One of the main ways communication was established by the shaman was through 
sacrificial activities, synchronized rhythmic drumming activities and singing-joiking. Many 
of these activities were focused upon fertility rituals and seasonal cycles and shifts in relation 
to hunting and reindeer herding 
Today, the remaining 71 drums can be found in museum colections throughout 
Europe, the majority (37) being in the archives of the Nordiska Museet in Stockholm, 
Sweden. 
Ever since the campaign through colonialism by the Swedish state, the Sámi shaman 
drum has been recognized by the Sámi as both as a symbol of resistance but also and more 
                             
82 See the works of Ernst Manker 1938 & 1950. His works contain photographs of al the surviving drums and 
their content and interpretations. 
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importantly, one of fundamental representations of culture and self-identification of the Sámi 
as an indigenous peoples.  
Throughout the Nordic countries within the last several decades, in-depth historical 
research investigating the corelations linking symbols, figures, designs and paterns between 
prehistoric rock carvings, paintings and Sámi shaman drum motifs has determined how there 
are remarkable paralels and thereby, links between such documented art forms. As a result, 
much ambiguity has arisen in relation to the cultural context and ethnicity of the prehistoric 
art. 
It is at this point the focus of this paper turns towards two distinctive features in 
relation to the practice of Sámi shamanism both past and present with regard to cultural 
heritage, cultural property and protection. 
 
2. Prehistoric rock art in Finland and Sámi cultural heritage 
Curently, there are documented “[…] between 118 and 143” (Luukkonen 1994-2016) 
rock paintings in Finland. An abundance of scholarly sources have been writen on this topic 
since the majority of the paintings have been discovered within the past 40 years (for 
example, see: Lahelma 2005, 2008 and 2008a; Nunez 1994 and 1995; Sikala 1981 and Kare 
2000). The majority of the paintings are located in the Saimaa and Päijänne Lake regions 
located in the south east of the country close to water. At many of these sites Sámi place-
names can be found in addition to figures and symbolism which paralels those painted on 
Sámi shaman drums from Norway, Sweden and Finland from the 17th and 18th centuries, thus 
demonstrating how there have been Sámi setlements in these areas previously. Despite the 
age of the paintings, the sites are predominantly used as tourist atractions to the extent a 
dozen sites have sufered vandalism and damage. 
One further point as has been stated by Lahelma (2008) is how many of the scenes in 
the rock paintings concerning human and animal interactions are remarkably similar to those 
on the noaidi drums, and yet the paintings are in their present cultural context, refered to as 
‘Finnish’. In addition, one of the main problems in rock art research in relation to the cultural 
context, ethnicity and dating of the art is their location below the Arctic Circle, in present day 
Finland. So, there is great scope for argument regarding the cultural context of the paintings 
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which has not yet been discussed in terms of cultural heritage and legal maters relating to 
Sámi history and pre-Christian religion. 
The content of the rock paintings do in a similar fashion to the drum symbolism portray 
a type of Cognitive Map representing the grammar of the mind or mindscapes, as wel as the 
body, which are intimately linked to activities related to maintaining Cosmic Order between 
the diferent levels of the universe. The location chosen to paint the rocks may also have 
represented a type of cosmic pilar or world tree. Al of these features bear the halmark of the 
work of the shaman and in fact it has been the shaman’s out-of-body journeys to other realms 
of existence which have not only helped to create mythical stories but re-enact older ones as a 
way of maintaining the culture. 
In my earlier research, I have noticed that rock paintings in Finland are listed a part of 
Finnish cultural heritage and not Sámi. Therefore, a problem exists concerning Sámi 
shamanism and the forwarding and protection of traditional knowledge so that it may be 
preserved for future generations. Within the study of the content of prehistoric rock art it is 
critical one understands the diferences in viewpoints in relation to worldviews between 
western and indigenous peoples and their cultures. In indigenous societies, sacred places are 
not ofered as tourist atractions, instead, and as Grimm (1998: 2-3) has stated: 
“Indigenous lifeways as ways of knowing the world are both 
descriptive of enduring modes of sustainable livelihood, and 
prescriptive of ecological imaginaries, or deep communal, psychic 
atractors between place and people that activate sustaining 
relationships with the community of life. It is this close relationship 
and conceptual reflection found in mythic stories and ritual symbolism 
systems that we can cal a “religious ecology”. 
 
Needless to say, the fact that nearly al the drums colected during the 17th and 18th 
centuries from Lapland and how the rock paintings sites are in terms of what I wil refer to as 
‘established views’, the cultural property of persons outside of Sámi culture shows there are 
many legal issues which exist in relation to Sámi ways of life, their cultural history and 
dilution of their pre-Christian religion. 
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3. The use of Sámi drums symbolism within the tourist industry in Finland 
Another dimension in research which is currently being investigated by the author is the 
reproduction of new types of shaman drums, predominantly in Finland, by Finnish businesses 
and also tourism enterprises and individual artists which are marketed chiefly within the 
tourist industry. The new models are reminiscent of the oval shapes of older drums but the 
symbols and figures are almost identical copies. These can be found in tourist and souvenir 
shops throughout Finnish Lapland. 
It is the reproduction and re-use of the symbolism from the old drums which is the 
cause of ambiguity in terms of legal issues and the Sámi’s rights to protect and preserve their 
culture. For example, in her scholarly works titled: Duodji – Sami Handicrafts – who owns 
the knowledge and the works? Gunvor Gutorm (2007: 84-85) has made a specific point of 
stating how in Lapland “on the Finnish side, the Samis have often regreted that Finns have 
incorporated Sami symbols in their own culture and commercialism”. One could interpret 
these actions as an extension of the colonialism practices and mentality of assimilation of the 
Sámi and their culture into that of the Finnish Nation State. 
The use of drums which contain symbols and figures copied from the original Sámi 
ones seems most prevalent within Lapland safari excursions, for example, under the northern 
lights during winter months and as wel as the midnight sun in the summer. The end product 
is commercial exploitation of Sámi cultural heritage and history. 
One theory concerning further observation of this phenomenon in Lapland and which 
appears to be a significant contribution underlying exploitation is the idea that Sámi 
shamanism and religion does not exist anymore in Lapland, therefore, it is oficialy dead. 
Moreover, the traditions and old ways are finished and gone. 
In interviews caried out with Sámi shamans in Finland, the mentality surrounding the 
destruction of shamanism has been expressed in terms of a constant struggle to keep what is 
left alive with regard to the fragments of history. Fortunately, the Sámi shamans have the 
skil at adapting to change for example, where old meets new and the combination of these 
two help to strengthen the existing fragments, despite the persecutions stil going on within 
both the Lutheran Church as wel as contemporary society. One of the visible manifestations 
of Sámi spiritual culture is seen in the re-enactment of myths and stories within Sámi theatre, 
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films, poems and book. The shamans who are also artists, play a key role within each of these 
fields; some even working within the tourist industry and modern working sectors. 
To elaborate on the loss of culture in relation to rock paintings and the Finnish state and 
also the possession of drums which belong to the shamans in Sámi society we may arrive at 
the folowing conclusions. 
It could be argued as to how, and in particular Sámi children’s education in Finland is 
deficient of these two aspects of their spiritual culture. The reason being is that the 60% of 
Sámi persons and their families who live outside of the Sámi homelands within Arctic Circle, 
in towns and cities, receive mainstream Christian Finnish education in schools as part of the 
National Curiculum to which Sámi history does not exist. 
However, in Lapland throughout the Sámi areas, stories and myths are included in 
schools and education for Sámi children. 
By contrast, in Norway for example, and since Sámi shamanism was made an oficial 
religion in 2012 and as I have witnessed during fieldwork, Sámi shamans who are artists and 
integrated educators, also teach about their culture and history at Sámi schools in the 
municipalities in northern Norway. This also includes drum making and visits to prehistoric 
rock art sites, such as the one at Alta Fjord, Finnmark. These activities do not exist in Sámi 
children’s education in Finland. 
The Sámi shamans in Finland, for the most remain invisible and work in secret, which 
is part of the traditional ways and customs and also as a way to help protect what is left of the 
culture and religion. The situation in Sweden and Norway is very diferent. However, there 
are also similar situations that exist in al Sámi societies in relation to secrecy because the 
older generations have been taught to deny their ethnic religion and believe it is evil, 
especialy the use of the drum. At the same time, some Churches in southern Norway use 
drums as a part of the religious service. 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
It seems that in both cases regarding the plight of rock paintings in Finland in relation 
to cultural heritage of the Sámi and the Sámi shaman drums in museums throughout Europe, 
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as cultural property of the Sámi, nothing looks set to change concerning the restoration of 
knowledge. 
It is my opinion that these issues provide much scope for future legal work for scholars 
both inside and out of Sámi society and thereby, could support further opportunities for 
cooperation between cultures. 
The Sámi shaman and Sámi shamanism play a fundamental role in terms of the 
preservation of identity and culture across Fennoscandia, and the transmission of traditional 
ecological knowledge. The shaman’s knowledge, wisdom and related spiritual practices and 
preservations of traditions and intimate relationships with the landscapes seem now at this 
time more important than ever. 
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8. 
The Agricultural Argument and Sami Reindeer Breeding Rights: Reflections on Legal 
Philosophy in the Arctic 
 
René Kuppe 
 
Abstract. 
The paper is to shed the light on the agricultural agreement in the light of Sami reindeer 
breeding rights. These are reflections on legal philosophy in the Arctic. 
 
  1. Introduction 
  The expansion of seter states over the lands and teritories of indigenous peoples is a 
world-wide phenomenon (see, e.g. Green & Dickason, 1993; Keale, 2003). The legitimacy of 
this expansion was based on the idea that indigenous peoples lacked a political or “civil” 
society of their own. Therefore, the political system of the intrusive colonizing society was 
imposed on the lands and over the way of life of the “Native” inhabitants. Even if the 
colonizers were aware that these lands were not physicaly uninhabited, they were somehow 
perceived as being “legaly uninhabited”83. But this process of large-scale transmission of 
“civilized” law into “primitive” lands does not mean that the Native inhabitants were defined 
as living outside of any kind of legal rule. Beginning with the conquest of indigenous lands in 
the 16th century by the Spaniards, European philosophers had begun to develop ideas of a 
natural legal order, protecting and binding even those humans who were living outside of the 
reigns of civil society and Christian statehood. On the folowing pages, I wil discuss how the 
debates on indigenous peoples living in a “state of nature” also influence the way how the 
rights of the Sami peoples of Northern Europe have been designed and limited. The 
consequences of political theories about indigenous people, living in a so-caled state of 
nature, can be detected not only in overseas territories discovered in remote parts of the 
world, but also in Nordic indigenous teritories conquered by setlers from neighbouring 
civilized nations. Only recently the law of the Nordic states has begun to overcome the unjust 
discrimination that was the outcome of the “state of nature”-doctrine.  
 
                             
 Professor René Kuppe (Austria; University of Vienna, Department of Legal Philosophy, Law of Religion and 
Culture), rene.kuppe@univie.ac.at 
83 Discussing in detail the „legaly uninhabited“-rule: Secher, 2007. 
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  2. Sámi territorial rights in Sweden 
  As Christina Alard states in her comparative study on Sámi teritorial rights in the 
Nordic countries, during most of the 1900s, these countries “assumed that the Sámi semi-
nomadic and wide ranging use of lands did not qualify for establishing rights to land and 
resources” (Alard, 2001, 7). 
 In 1886, Sweden enacted for the first time a legal framework for reindeer grazing of 
the Swedish Sami people. In a very ground-breaking publication, Eivind Torp (Torp, 2013) 
discusses the relevance of the legislative history of this 19th century statute for a critical 
understanding of Sami land and land use rights. The members of the Swedish Parliament 
shared a general understanding that the planned legal regulation did not have the purpose of 
establishing the rights of the reindeer Sami, but a new law rather should define the limits 
between their rights and the rights of Swedish peasants, whose ancestors had colonised large 
parts of Northern Sweden since the 16th century, ariving from the South and from the shores 
of the Gulf of Bothia in the East. Since its origin approximately 1000 years ago, semi-
nomadic reindeer herding in Scandinavia is based on a complex, geographicaly wide-ranging 
land use patern, and involves the use of diferent pasture areas, especialy in summer and in 
winter time. In summer, intense herding took place in the mountainous areas in the West, 
near to the (modern) border with Norway, while in winter the herders came down to the 
lower forest region near the sea, to what they considered as their winter pastures since 
centuries. However, most of these winter pasture lands have been colonized and setled by 
Swedish people, who had been puled into these Northern regions through tax exemptions 
and other privileges issued by the Swedish Crown. 
  Alard states in her doctoral thesis: “The idea of colonising the north was coupled 
with the so caled paralel-theory, a belief that the agricultural purposes for colonising those 
areas were so diferent from the uses that the reindeer herding Saami were making of the 
land, that the Saami and the non-Saami could coexist without dificulty.” (Alard, 2007, 34). 
  Although actualy there had developed a certain pragmatic coexistence between 
(nomadic) Sami and sedentary Swedish setlers, “in the late 1800s, antagonisms between the 
two livelihoods had become an increasingly tangible problem” (Torp, 2013, 47). This 
situation, as it is explained briefly, is the background of the legislative debates taking place in 
Sweden in 1886. 
  An interesting consideration on the reindeer breeding rights of the Sami as indigenous 
rights in the modern sense of the word are expressed by the parliamentary commitee, in the 
folowing words: 
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“It was the Lapp who first claimed the northern reaches of our country. Before the first setler 
feled the first tree in the forests of Norland, the Lapp was already there. Over the centuries, 
he has without objection used the land from the mountain ridges of the Scandians to the Gulf 
of Bothnia as pastureland for his reindeer. And the right of the first claimant to the land must 
be considered stronger than that of he who […] later arived.” (Appendix to the 
Parliamentary Record for 1886, cited by Torp, 2013, 48). 
  So, the commitee members recognised, and seemed to have had no serious doubts, 
about the “stronger” historical rights of the reindeer breeders, valid in the North of Sweden. 
But did these rights of the Sami, as “first claimants”, come close to the atributes of 
ownership rights, in the sense of Swedish official law? 
 It is worth the effort to reproduce the words, also  cited by Torp from the 
parliamentary record of 1886, because of their unusual clarity: 
“But the Lapp’s claim was, by nature, not such that it encompassed al the powers that belong 
to the concept of ownership. It did not extend beyond that required by the limited needs of the 
nomadic life. It referred only to, first, the use of the land as pasture for the reindeer, in the 
mountain regions during the summer and in the forests in the winter, and, second, to the 
fulfilment of the needs that were a prerequisite for or a consequence of the use of the reindeer 
pasture. For this reason, the nature of the Lapp’s right to the land was from the beginning 
such that it did not prevent the paralel rise, so to speak, of ownership in the sense understood 
by civilized society” (Appendix to Parliamentary record, cited by Torp, 2013, 49). 
  So, the historical right of the Sami breeders over their grazing lands were not only 
distinct from the comprehensive atributes of “ful” ownership rights of civilized society, 
because they were limited to guarantee the exercise of reindeer breeding; they also did not 
stand in the way of “real” ownership rights over land, introduced by Swedish peasant setlers 
into ancient Sami teritory.  
  The Parliamentary Commitee also expressed its view about the legitimacy of 
introducing private setler ownership into this teritory: 
“And such ownership emerged and spread with cultivation, and finaly included the areas as 
yet unclaimed by cultivation, because about 300 years ago in our country, the fundamental 
principle began to be expressed and applied that ‘such lands that lay unbuilt belong to God, 
the King and the Swedish Crown.’” (Appendix to the Parliamentary Record for 1886, cited 
by Torp, 2013, 49). 
  So, even if the emerging ownership of land cultivating setlers did not extinguish as 
such the rights of Sami reindeer herders, the Swedish crown – in other words, the state power 
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that had not been established and created by the Sami themselves – could extend legal claims 
over areas “unclaimed by cultivation”. The claims of the Swedish state, of “the King and the 
Crown” over teritories used by the Sami nomads had been established against their wil and 
laid the foundation stone for the speedy privatization of lands into the hands of the Swedish 
land cultivating setlers.   
  The basic idea expressed by the Record was that private property over lands was 
related to cultivation of the soil. In view of this, the rights of the Sami were limited to fulfil 
the needs required by reindeer breeding (and possibly by other traditional subsistence 
activities). Only a sedentary way of life of agriculturalists – associated with a “civilized 
society” – was supposed to give rise to “ful” ownership rights. This idea sounds familiar to 
anybody aware of the history of western legal philosophical thinking about the origins of 
state, law, and legal institutions. 
 
3. John Locke's justification of limited ownership of the Native Americans 
  One of the most important and best known contributions to a theory about the 
relationship between nature and ownership was developed by John Locke (1632-1704). This 
influential thinker of the English Enlightenment, sometimes caled the “Father of 
Liberalism”, developed a theory how individual ownership of goods and property can be 
justified. “According to Locke, God created the world and gave it to men in common to use 
for their sustenance in the state of nature” (Flanagan, 1989, 592). During this early era, 
according to Locke, men lived in a pre-political condition. But even if the world was owned 
in common, each man had private ownership of his own person. As expressed in Locke’s 
own words: “The labour of his body, and the work of his own hands, we may say, are 
properly his” (Locke, orig. 1689, para. 27). 
  The starting point for Locke to justify individual ownership over things and goods 
was labour. According to the views of Locke, when a person exerts labour upon a natural 
object, that labour enters into the object. Thus, the object becomes the property of that 
person. Or, in the words of Locke: “He by his labour does, as it were, inclose it from the 
common.” (Locke, orig. 1689, para. 32). So, original appropriation is justified by mixing 
individual labour with the resources of Nature (Flanagan, 1989, 592). “[L]abour, in the 
beginning, gave a right of property” (Locke, orig. 1689, para. 45). Such a claim of property 
does not need, to be legitimate, the consent of others, as it is directly authorized by the law of 
nature. 
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 In other words, the origin of private property did not require human conventions – and 
no civil society – but was based directly on nature. According to the law of nature, Locke 
however adds additional condition that this “original appropriation” by labour as legitimate:  
  First, appropriation must be based on the application of one’s own labour – a 
limitation inherent in man’s equal natural liberty; 
  And, secondly, appropriation based on natural law, should leave enough in common 
for others, and should not extend to more than could be used without spoilage – conditions 
that are based on the idea that even the acquisition of unowned Commons, according to 
natural law, is legitimate only if it does not worse the position of others. 
  For Locke, labour, in the form of agricultural cultivation, is the key to justify the 
appropriation of land. As secretary to both the Council of Trade and Plantations, and the Lord 
Proprietors of Carolina, he was especialy interested in questions related to the creation of 
ownership in the American colonies. On the one hand, his considerations based on natural 
law did not exclude the American Indians from the benefits of ownership: “Thus this law of 
reason makes the deer that Indian’s who hath kiled it; it is alowed to be his goods, who hath 
bestowed his labour upon it, though before it was the common right of every one (Locke, 
orig. 1689, para. 30). 
  Therefore, American Indians were the owners of the animals they had taken from 
nature; the same principles which regulate private appropriation of products of nature also 
apply to the soil. But the only natural justification for the ownership of the soil was agrarian 
use or, in Locke’s view, agrarian appropriation. The Native Indian had his right over his fruit 
or game, but this did not interfere with the claim of the Englishman, who was coming from 
the Old World into America: Locke compares the idleness of “several Nations of the 
Americans” with the industriousness of the English, or civil men (Arneil, 1996, 62). 
  Locke writes: “God gave the world to men in common; but since he gave it them for 
their benefit, and the greatest conveniencies of life they were capable to draw from it, it 
cannot be supposed he meant it should always remain common and uncultivated” (Locke, 
orig. 1689, para. 34). Nature and soil, in their original state, have very litle value for human 
beings. Is it human labour, the input of human industry, that are creating the value of natural 
resources; even the original inhabitants of non-tiled soils, like the American Indians, wil 
profit from the appropriation and the economic improvements of their former common lands.  
  According to the ideas of European enlightenment thinkers, the Indians of the New 
World, as nations living in a State of Nature, were entitled to what the Law of Nature gave to 
them – because these natural entitlements are not based on human convention:  They were 
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using the land, by taking fruits from it. But using the land was not the same like cultivating 
the land. Why should the natives be the owners of a land that was stil unsubdued, 
unimproved, uncultivated and unfenced? 
  The rights of the Indians were limited to what they could claim by natural law 
(Banner, 2005, 33). Only those nations who had reached the level of civil government 
developed human legal institutions that alowed the ownership over uncultivated lands. This 
is the reason why, according to European thinkers, cultivation was not a prerequisite to for 
ownership over land in Europe. “Anybody knew that [in Europe] land could be owned even it 
was not being farmed, and indeed even if it was not being used or occupied at al”84. As the 
European colonizers also introduced the legal systems of their country of origin this 
facilitated the extension of ownership claims over lands that even had not been cultivated by 
European setlers. 
  But what is the specific atribute that makes the distinction between the later and the 
former? 
  Of course, according to Locke, the English setler cultivates the lands85. Agricultural 
labour is the special foundation of the appropriation of land in North America. But, according 
to Locke, the cultivation of the land also goes hand in hand with the enclosure of the land. 
Enclosure, or “fencing” is seen as an essential aspect to mark out the boundaries of cultivated 
lands, and underlines the aloted parcels of setlers, taken out of the common goods of al. 
So, it was completely legitimate for civilized European people, to establish themselves in a 
country whose inhabitants had not established positive legal institutions, and who were taking 
fruits from the land, but had shown no wil to establish private property. 
  Locke was not the only influential thinker of European state philosophy, justifying the 
taking of lands of “uncivilized” peoples: As Ula Secher explains: 
“Gradualy […] the doctrine of terra nulius was extended to justify acquisition of inhabited 
teritories by occupation if the land was uncultivated or its indigenous inhabitants were not 
‘civilised’ or not organised in a society that was united permanently for political action.” 
(Secher, 2007). 
                             
84 Id. 
85 It is a striking aspect of Locke’s theories on the legitimacy of the establishment of ownership, relating to the 
Native American Indians tribes of Eastern North America, that most of these peoples practiced a slash-and-burn 
type of native agriculture, based on the combination of corn, beans and squash. It is an open question if Locke, 
familiar with a very different agrarian system in England, misunderstood this flexible form of native American 
Agriculture and classified it as “nomadism”, or if he simply misinformed his readers about the cultural atributes 
of native Americans of his time. It is a fact that in his famous treaties, Locke treated American Indians as if they 
were only wandering nomadic tribes.   
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  4. "Uncivilized nations" and property in the theory of international law 
  The famous Swiss 18th century philosopher Emer de Vatel, also considered as one of 
the founding fathers of modern international law, states: “Al mankind have an equal right to 
things that have not yet falen into the possession of any one; and those things belong to the 
person who first takes possession of them. When, therefore, a nation finds a country 
uninhabited, and without an owner, it may lawfuly take possession of it: and, after it has 
suficiently made known its wil in this respect, it cannot be deprived of it by another nation.” 
(Vatel, cited after Keale, 2003, 101). 
 It was an expanded notion of a tera nulius theory, based not only on the idea of the 
positive efects of an expansion of “Western” civilization, but also grounded in the view that 
the non-tiled lands otherwise would remain uncultivated (Patapan, 2000, 114). 
 It seems that one of these natural law thinkers explicitly neglected the possibility that 
people living in the state of nature could be the holders of private property as such. But 
property should be established by the criteria of Western civilization, especialy by using the 
land and cultivating it. The flexible and sometimes communitarian way by which indigenous 
people, especialy nomadic and seminomadic societies, were using the land, could not fit into 
this schedule of property, especialy as they were not fencing their land. Especialy the ideas 
of Locke were based on a Western concept of individual freedom, industrious work and 
property. Therefore, the native could be the legitimate owner of the deer he has kiled, but not 
the owner of the land on which he was just wandering around.  
 
  5. The philosophy of Swedish Reindeer Grazing Law 
  This philosophical view is the underlying intelectual background of the opinions 
expressed by the members of the parliamentary commitee, debating the Swedish Reindeer 
Grazing Law in 1886. The Sami nomads had the right to pursue reindeer herding, but this did 
not mean that they had the same powers as owners of the land (see Torp, 2012, 48/49). At the 
same time, the land of the Sami had been considered as “open” for the setlement by civilized 
farmers, and for the Swedish state to introduce civil legal institutions, protecting individual 
appropriation and land ownership. 
  Like in other setler states, traditional indigenous land use was not seen as suficient 
qualification to establish “real” ownership over lands and resources. As mentioned above, 
this situation has not changed until recently. 
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  Stil in the famous Taxed Mountains case86, a land mark case decided by the Swedish 
Supreme Court in 1981, the Court ruled that the Sami land use was not sufficiently intense or 
exclusive in character to establish ownership (see summary in Alard, 2011).  
  
  6. Conclusions 
  Only very recently things seem to change. The Swedish Nordmaling case87, decided 
by the Supreme Court in 2011, has atracted atention because Sami claimants succeeded and 
their reindeer herding rights were upheld. But a most significant aspect of the case is the 
foundation of this verdict: 
  The rights over the winter pasture lands are founded on Sami customary law. It is an 
open question if the term customary law, as it was used by the Supreme Court, wil be 
suficiently adjusted to Sami tradition and to conceptions about land use. In that case, 
Swedish law would possibly leave behind its unique and exclusive liberal philosophical 
foundation of rights over land, based on the ideas of agrarian cultivation and privatization of 
the commons. 
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9. 
Sámi Relationship with the Land: What Does the Law Fail to Recognize? 
 
Leena Heinämäki, Sanna Valkonen, Jarno Valkonen 
 
Abstract 
The purpose of this article is to make an overview on how UN Human Rights Commitee 
(HRC), a monitoring body of CCPR, articulates and protects Sámi culture and its values. The 
further aim of this writing is to discuss Sámi people’s relationship with the Land, its 
ontological basis and the failure of Finnish legislation to recognize crucial aspects of this 
relationship and inherently connected worldview.  
 
1. Introduction 
An integral part of Indigenous people’s culture and worldview is their special 
relationship to the land and the closely connected traditional knowledge and practices. The 
relationship to the land is a fundamental question of existence for Indigenous peoples, as 
cultures grow from the land and in places. The relationship to the land bears on the place 
where an indigenous people dwels and is, where its members practice their traditional way of 
life, and what the people’s broader cultural conception is of itself, its identity and its past.88 
Although international law, significantly stronger than the Finnish national legislation, 
succeeds to recognize some key features of Sámi and other indigenous peoples’ unique 
relationship with the Land, it necessarily fails to embrace and thus protect its totality, while 
resting on profoundly diferent premises than an indigenous worldview. In other words, the 
                             
 Senior Researcher Dr. Leena Heinamäki (Finland; University of Lapland, Northern Institute for 
Environmental and Minority Law), the vice-leader of the University of the Arctic Thematic Network on Arctic 
Law), leena.heinamaki@ulapland.fi, Associate Professor in Sámi research Dr. Sanna Valkonen (Finland; 
University of Lapland, Faculty of Social Sciences), sanna.valkonen@ulapland.fi, Professor of Sociology Jarno 
Valkonen, (Finland; University of Lapland, Faculty of Social Sciences), jarno.valkonen@ulapland.fi 
(S. Valkonen and J. Valkonen are Sámi.) 
88 See T. Ingold, The Perception of the Environment. Essays on Livelihood, Dweling and Skil, Routledge 2000, 
pp. 148-150. 
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reality of indigenous peoples, as widely experienced and expressed, is based on a diferent 
ontology than that underlying the Western way of seeing the world.89 
One of the main international human rights instruments, ratified by the most states of 
the global community, including Finland, which has an established practice related to 
indigenous peoples, is International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR).90 The 
aim of this article is to have an overview on how UN Human Rights Commitee (HRC)91, a 
monitoring body of CCPR, articulates and protects Sámi culture and its values. The further 
aim of this writing is to discuss Sámi people’s relationship with the Land, its ontological 
basis and the failure of Finnish legislation to recognize crucial aspects of this relationship and 
inherently connected worldview. 
 
2. Sámi and other Indigenous Peoples’ Relationship with the Land in Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights 
  Article 27 of the CCPR may be regarded as a basic norm in protecting the right of 
indigenous peoples to their cultural integrity. HRC recognizes that indigenous peoples’ 
subsistence and other traditional economic and social activities are an integral part of their 
culture. Interference with such activities may be detrimental to their cultural integrity and 
survival.92 HRC has acknowledged that, in the context of indigenous peoples, the right to 
culture under Article 27 may apply to a way of life that is closely connected to a teritory and 
the use of its resources. Furthermore, it has stated that the enjoyment of such rights may 
require positive protective legal measures and methods for ensuring the effective 
participation of minority communities’ members in decisions that afect them.93 The 
                             
89 See M. Blaser, Ontology and Indigeneity: On the Political Ontology of Heterogeneous Assemblages, 
“Cultural Geographies” 2012, pp. 1-10; T. Ingold, The Perception of the Environment. Essays on Livelihood, 
Dweling and Skil, Routledge 2000, pp. 132–152; see also S. Valkonen, J. Valkonen and V.-P. Lehtola, An 
Ontological politics of and for the Sami cultural heritage – Reflections on Belonging to Sámi Community and 
Land, In A. Xanthaki, S. Valkonen, L. Heinämäki and P. Nuorgam (eds.), Indigenous Peoples’ Cultural 
Heritage: Rights, Debates, Chalenges. Bril. Forthcoming 2016. 
90 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR), G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 UN GAOR Supp. 
(No. 16), at 52, UN Doc. A/6316 (1966), adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976, 999 
United Nations Treaty Series 171. Status of ratification: 161 (6 May 2008); Optional Protocol to the CCPR, 
G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 16), at 59, UN Doc. A/6316 (1966), adopted 16 December 
1966, entered into force 23 March 1976, 999 United Nations Treaty Series 302. There are 111 parties to the 
Optional Protocol (6 May 2008). 
91 The UN Human Rights Commitee was established under Article 28 of the CCPR, see CCPR, Arts 28-34. 
92 See Kitokv. Sweden, Communication No. 197/1985, CCPR/C/33/D/197/1985 (1988), 
htp:/www1.umn.edu/humanrts/undocs/197-1985.html ( 21 January 21, 2007). 
93Ibid., at 7. 
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Commitee has also stated that the protection of the above mentioned right is directed at 
ensuring the survival and continued development of the cultural, religious, and social identity 
of the minorities concerned, which also enriches the fabric of society as a whole.94 
  When studying HRC’s general comments as wel as case studies, it becomes evident 
that more than emphasising indigenous peoples’ worldviews or values, HRC tends to protect 
the economic sustainability of their nature-based livelihoods. The Commitee has stated that 
Article 27 requires states to utilize the necessary steps in protecting indigenous peoples’ titles 
and interests in their traditional lands and to secure the continuation and sustainability of 
indigenous minorities’ traditional economies.95 There are, however, some instances where 
indigenous worldview is touched upon, particularly related to indigenous peoples’ places of 
worship (sacred natural sites). In its Concluding Observations on Australia (2000), HRC 
expressed “its concern that securing continuation and sustainability of traditional forms of 
economy of indigenous minorities (hunting, fishing and gathering), and protection of sites of 
religious or cultural significance for such minorities, which must be protected under article 
27, are not always a major factor in determining land use.”96 HRC further stated that the 
Australian law reform related to the Aboriginal and Tores Strait Islander Heritage Protection 
Act (1984), which recognizes also sacred sites culturaly and traditionaly significant for 
Australian Aboriginals, should give sufficient weight to the values important to indigenous 
peoples.97 
It seems that HRC, in principle, is wiling to recognize aspects of indigenous peoples’ 
worldview, including spiritual, social and environmental values. It could be argued that if 
indigenous authors that bring claims to the HRC would strongly argue the need to protect 
their values and not solely a livelihood in an economicaly sustainable sense, there might be 
readiness in the Commitee to expand the protection towards value-based rather than 
economic-based ground. For instance, in one Sámi case, Länsman et al v. Finland,98 HRC did 
acknowledge that the mountain Riutusvaara continues to have a spiritual significance relevant 
to the culture of the Sámi community.99 However, despite that in this complaint the Sámi 
authors observed that the site of this mount where the quarying of stone took place is a 
                             
94Ibid. 
95 Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Commitee: Australia, UN Doc. CCPR/CO/69/AUS (2000), 
paras 10-11. 
96 Para 510. 
97 Para 511, Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976, Part VII, s.69. 
98 Länsman et al v. Finland, Communication No. 511/1992, UN Doc. CCPR/C/52/D/511/1992 (1994). 
99 Para 9.3. 
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sacred area of the old Sámi religion, where in old times reindeer were slaughtered,100 the 
basis of the claim was not the value of the sacred area as such to Sámi people. Instead, the 
authors affirmed that the quarying of stone on the flank of the Riutusvaara mountain and its 
transportation through their reindeer herding teritory would violate their rights under article 
27 of the Covenant, in particular their right to enjoy their own culture, which has traditionaly 
been and remains essentialy based on reindeer husbandry.101 Perhaps because the authors did 
not actualy reason the sacredness of the mountain area as a basis of the actual claim, also the 
Commitee did not take a clear standpoint in this particular mater.102 Since the Commitee 
clearly recognizes spiritual values as a part of the cultural integrity of indigenous peoples, 
this argumentation could have brought an extra weight to this particular case that was lost by 
the Sámi authors, while HRC did not find a significant harm being done to the reindeer 
husbandry. 
One limit to fuly recognize colective elements of indigenous peoples’ cultures and 
related worldview is that cases brought to HRC cannot invoke the violation of article 1 of 
CCPR, a people’s right to self-determination, because the right of self-determination is a right 
of a colective (a people), and HRC deals with individual claims.103 This may limit HRC from 
puting a colective rather than particular individuals at the center, thus failing to get a 
comprehensive picture of and place focus on the colective values in a wholesome way. The 
right of self-determination is, however, endorsed by HRC in State reporting system.104 In 
2013, HRC, in its Concluding Observations on Finland’s country-report, expressed its 
concern that the Sámi people lack participation and decision-making powers over maters of 
fundamental importance to their culture and way of life, including rights to land and 
resources.105 The Commitee also noted that there might be insuficient understanding or 
accommodation of the Sámi lifestyle by public authorities and that there is a lack of legal 
clarity on the use of land in areas traditionaly inhabited by the Sámi people. HRC also stated 
                             
100 Para 2.6. 
101 Para 3.1. 
102 For an analysis, see, L. Heinämäki and T. Herrmann, The Recognition of Sacred Natural Sites of Arctic 
Indigenous Peoples as Part of their Cultural Integrity, “Arctic Review on Law and Politics”, vol. 4, 2/2013, pp. 
206-231. 
103 See, Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, Communication No. 167/1984, CCPR/C/38/D167/1984. 
104 See Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Commitee on Canada UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.105 
(1999). Explicit references to either Article 1 or to the notion of self-determination have also been made in the 
Commitee’s Concluding Observations on Mexico, UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.109 (1999); Norway, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/79/Add.112 (1999); Australia, UN Doc. CCPR/CO/69/Aus (2000); Denmark, UN Doc. 
CCPR/CO/70/DNK (2000); Sweden, UN Doc. CCPR/CO/74/SWE (2002); Finland, UN Doc. CCPR/CO/82/FIN 
(2004); Canada , UN Doc. CCPR/C/CAN/CO/5 (2005); and the United States, UN Doc. CCPR/C/USA/CO/3 
(2006); Sweden, UN Doc. CCPR/C/SWE/CO/6 (2009); Finland, UN Doc. CCPR/C/FIN/CO/6 (2013). 
105 UN Human Rights Commitee, Concluding Observations on Finland, CCPR/C/FIN/CO/6 (22 August 2013), 
para 16. 
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that decision-making powers of Sámi representative institutions, such as the Sámi parliament 
should be strengthened. Finland was asked to increase its eforts to revise its legislation to 
fuly guarantee the rights of the Sámi people in their traditional land, ensuring respect for the 
right of Sámi communities to engage in free, prior and informed participation in policy and 
development process that afect them.106 
This Concluding Observation makes several important statements. First of al, HRC 
expresses its concern that public authorities may have insuficient understanding about “Sámi 
lifestyle”. Although not directly speaking about the necessity to understand Sámi worldview, 
HRC is in the right track by viewing that the seed of the problem might be the lack of 
understanding Sámi lifestyle – thus their way of life. Second important comment of HRC is 
the requirement of strengthening the Sámi institutions such as Sámi Parliament. This 
Concluding Observation is based on article 1 (people’s right to self-determination), article 26 
(equality before law) and article 27 (right of minorities to their culture) of CCPR. HRC, 
refering to the right to self-determination, emphasizes the need to empower Sámi Parliament 
and declares strong participatory rights. 
This Concluding Observation points towards Sámi people’s right to free, prior and 
informed consent in decisions that are crucial to them. Although using a milder formulation 
of “participation”, it should be mentioned that after the international adoption of the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) (2007), HRC, in a case against 
Peru, has explicitly acknowledged indigenous peoples’ right to free, prior and informed 
consent.107 
As it can be seen, HRC makes strong statements in relation to State Parties to CCPR. 
A general problem, in Finland and elsewhere, is the lack of national implementation in a 
satisfactory manner. Recently, there has been several atempts in Finland to folow HRC’s 
recommendations, such as ratification of ILO Convention No. 169, changes in legislation 
related to Sámi Parliament (stronger decision-making powers, Sámi definition etc), and 
Metsähalitus (Forest Park Service managing the state-owned lands), which al have failed in 
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the last minute. In the case of reforming Metsähalitus Act, however, no final decisions have 
been made regarding Sámi people’s rights. Importantly, UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples, has recently reproached Finland for its failure to recognize Sámi 
people’s rights and ful participation in the present draft of the Metsähalitus Act.108 In the 
earlier draft, prepared years in consultation with the Sámi Parliament and Skolt Sámi vilage 
association, Sámi people were guaranteed rather strong rights of participation in al activities 
that might afect their nature-based way of life. 
 
3. Ontological Basis of the Sámi Belongingness to the Land and Lack of Legal 
Recognition 
The connection to the land in Sámi culture is an ethnic underpinning of al Sámi 
groups and the foundation from which Sámi culture dwels. According to anthropologist J. 
Pennanen, underpinning the Sámi feeling of ethnic identity is the conception that they belong 
to the same language family and share a nature-bound cultural background comprising the 
hunting, fishing and gathering livelihoods and reindeer herding.109 Sámi culture has a 
connection to a historical place defined through their life practices, to the ethnic ties and 
social relations which prevail in that place, to memories and to biographical experiences of 
place. The connection to the land produces and sustains Sáminess and through the connection 
a Sámi today can experience an afinity with Sámi who lived milennia ago.110 
Any examination of the Sámi connection to the land must take into consideration that 
the connection involves both the intangible and material cultural components. The Sámi 
worldview makes no distinction between nature and culture, nor are the two mutualy 
exclusive. Accordingly, the connection to the land is seen as including not only a material 
bond but also elements of the intangible cultural heritage, such as place names and the oral 
tradition. In the Sámi worldview, the human being is not an agent who manipulates or 
exploits nature; rather, the relation entails a deeper awareness of, belonging to and obligation 
                             
108 17 December 2015, 
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towards a place.111 The Sámi connection can be aptly described as ”ecological connectivity”, 
a term coined by D. Rose. It indicates a ”mode of existence”, in which the land is not only a 
place or object but also a subject (or ”agent”) in its own right.112 According to Rose, for 
indigenous peoples, the land is ”nourishing terain… a living entity with a yesterday, today 
and tomorow, with a consciousness, and a wil toward life. Because of this richness, country 
is home and peace; nourishment for body, mind, and spirit; heart’s ease”.113  
In R. Harison’s view, the ontological basis of Indigenous peoples’ connection to the 
land hampers eforts to safeguard their intangible cultural heritage. He asserts that the 
protection of indigenous cultural heritage is based on a Western, anthropocentric mentality 
that emphasizes a distinction diference between culture and nature and a pre-eminence of 
human beings over nature. In indigenous ontologies, by contrast, there is no boundary 
between nature and culture; rather they emphasize that the two are intertwined and that 
culture is everywhere. Indigenous peoples’ connection to the land and notions of protecting 
their culture proceed from a wholy diferent ontological basis, making protection of cultural 
heritage chalenging.114 
It is dificult or even impossible to fit the Sámi conceptions on their environment into 
public categories used in defining, protecting and managing cultural environments since to 
Sámi, natural landscape is also cultural regardless of whether it bears traces of human 
activity.115 E. Helander-Renval writes how the Sámi language does not even have the word 
‘culture’, and the word for ‘nature’ relates rather to inner aspects of nature (such as the non-
human mind) than to the natural environment or landscape. Nature can also be transformed 
into culture through diferent activities, such as handicraft, fishing and healing, and culture 
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may be transformed into nature.116 “Al places and lands have their special character.”117 
According to Helander-Renval, the places where the Sámi live are connected to “activities, 
experiences, stories, songs, ceremonies, mythic relationships, social interactions, and 
memories”.118 
Management of the environment in the Sámi homeland of Finland is governed for the 
most part by the Wilderness Act and the Conservation Act, which are an essential element of 
the Finnish system. In contrast, sites in the Sámi cultural environment, in particular cultural 
usufruct areas, have not been given any particular consideration. Yet, given that Sámi 
usufruct of the landscape and environment difers from the Finnish, it easily remains 
invisible. It lives in the cultural knowledge of smal communities and, inasmuch as it has not 
been articulated and asserted verbaly, it is ignored in decision making. 
According to E. Helander-Renval, the Sámi connection to the land is based on 
customary rights that are integrated in the form of an oral tradition into the daily practices of 
the local community”.119 The members of the Sámi community do not even conceive of these 
as rules; the practices are renegotiated if someone for one reason or another departs from the 
land-use practices established by custom. Helander-Renval takes the view that the use and 
applicability of traditional legal notions is further eroded by the fact that there is a constant 
colision between them and national legislation and orders issued by government authorities. 
Moreover, the non-Sámi population in the Sámi region does not necessarily adhere to or even 
know the Sámi’s traditional norms when it comes to use of the land, a situation which might 
even prompt some members of the Sámi community to depart from the norms.120 What is 
more, as T. Kurtila and T. Ingold have shown, the Sámi’s traditional system of knowledge 
underlying their use of the land is very difficult, if not impossible, to express in concrete 
terms, for it is far too dynamic and practicaly oriented and adapts too readily to the situation 
at hand.121 
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The nature of indigenous peoples’ connection of the land, including the underpinnings 
of that connection in customary law, has led to its not necessarily being accepted – or 
accepted at al – as equal to what is set out in the writen legislation of the state. Yet, this does 
not mean that, for example, rules deriving from customary law cannot be taken as the basis 
for legislation or as part of it. There are many examples internationaly of how customary law 
has been taken into account in legal proceedings and negotiations dealing with indigenous 
peoples’ land rights. 122 According to Helander-Renval, acknowledging the customary rights 
indicating the connection of an indigenous people in a state’s land-use policies requires active 
elaboration of the connection to the land through diferent practices and discourses so that the 
rights wil be recognized more broadly and become part of society’s commitments. 123 
The right to cultural autonomy for the Sámi, as an indigenous people, is recognized by 
the Article 17 (3) of the Finnish Constitution. In accordance with this, several domestic 
legislations are in place in order to concretize this right. Sámi traditional livelihoods, namely 
reindeer herding, fishing and hunting, are recognized as a part of their culture.124 General 
failure of the articulation in Finnish legal instruments is that it talks about livelihood, which 
emphasizes an economical aspect, thus failing to embrace the culture as a wholesome way of 
life that includes certain values and worldview. Although the Sámi Parliament is functioning 
with the task to “look after the Sámi language and culture, as wel as to take care of maters 
relating to their status as an indigenous people”125, in real, their decision-making powers are 
rather limited. Authorities are obliged to negotiate with the Sámi Parliament in “al far-
reaching and important measures which may directly and in a specific way afect the status of 
the Sámi as an indigenous people and which concern maters in the Sámi homeland.”126 In 
reality, however, this means “an opportunity to be heard and discuss on maters”. Failure to 
use this opportunity, however, in no way prevents the authority from proceeding.127 
 
 
                             
122 See E. Helander-Renval 2013, p. 132; See also M. de la Cadena, Indigenous Cosmopolitics in the Andes: 
Conceptual Reflections beyond Politics, “Cultural Anthropology”, vol. 25 (2), pp. 334–70; M. Blaser, Ontology 
and Indigeneity: on the Political Ontology of Heterogeneous Assemblages, "Cultural Geographies" 2012, pp. 1-
10. 
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124 PeVL 38/2004 vp. 
125 Sámi Parliament act, 974/1995 (amendments up to 1026/2003 included), Section 9. 
126 Ibid., art. 9. 
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4. Concluding Remarks 
We argue that if there is a true wil to protect the rights and cultures of Indigenous 
peoples in a way that future generations can engage with it and feel a connection to previous 
generations, it must be understood and taken seriously that indigeneity refers to a diferent 
way of conceiving of reality and the world. In other words, the reality of an indigenous 
people is based on a diferent ontology than that underlying the Western way of seeing the 
world.128 This being the case, eforts to safeguard the culture and the very existence of Sámi 
as an indigenous people should be predicated expressly on the people’s own ontologies and 
respect for those ontologies. 
At least a partial legal solution in Finland would be the finalizing and accepting the 
Draft Nordic Sámi Convention.129 Similarly to the UNDRIP, the Convention endorses Sámi 
people’s right to self-determination and free, prior and informed consent in crucial issues 
such as maters related to the use and management of natural resources. The Draft 
Convention is not explicitly inasmuch as the UNDRIP based on indigenous worldview, but 
does succeed to recognize Sámi belongingness to the Land in the form of traditional 
knowledge, customs and customary laws, and places the intimate and inherent nature-culture 
relationship at the centre. The Draft Convention creates a space, where states, when (and only 
when) wiling, together with respected Sámi Parliaments (that are given a strong role and 
decision-making power to actualize Sámi self-determination) could reach out to protect Sámi 
people’s rights, dweling rather from their own ontologies than solely on Western legal 
framework. 
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10. 
Dismantling the Dismantling of Federal Protection for Arctic Waterways: Revisiting 
Canada’s New Navigation Protection Act 
 
Maura Hanrahan 
 
Abstract 
This article cals for legislation with the necessary flexible mechanisms to protect the 
changing Arctic environment. Drastic changes in the Arctic are caused by from climate 
change,130 with adverse effects on Arctic waterways.131 Yet in 2012 Canada’s Conservative 
federal government passed legislation that removed the bulk of Canadian, including Arctic, 
waterways from federal protection. This article critiques the new legislation and suggests 
ways through which the Canadian federal government might revise it and develop related 
legislation that would enhance, rather than diminish, protection for the Arctic. 
 
  1. Introduction: Climate Change in the Arctic 
Climate change in the Arctic is occuring at an alarming rate, creating an unstable and 
unpredictable geophysical environment; this includes Arctic waterways.132 Inuit in Labrador 
and Nunavik (Northern Quebec) report rising temperatures, stronger tides, earlier springs, and 
changes in animals, including sickness in caribou and the arival of new species such as 
moose.133 Thus, these and related factors affect Inuit food security and other aspects of 
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health.134 The mental health of Circumpolar people is afected directly by climate change 
and/or indirectly through stressors like media reports or government policy135; the extreme 
changes to Canada’s Navigable Waters Act is one instance of this. 
 
2. Federal environmental protection in Canada 
In Canada, Arctic and other waterways had been protected under the Navigable 
Waters Protection Act, passed in 1985. Because of this act, in order for a project to proceed, 
its proponents had to submit their plans to a federal review process which used hearings and 
studies to cary out cost-benefit analysis and impact assessment, which were publicly 
reported on. Potential projects from several industries and sectors, such as construction, oil 
and gas, transportation, and telecommunication, al underwent this imperfect but useful 
process. 
 
3. Dismantling federal protection 
During a decade in power, the Conservative Government, led by Prime Minister 
Stephen Harper, formerly an economist and right-wing lobbyist, demonstrated a singular 
disregard for environmental protection. The 2010 federal speech from the throne portended 
widespread environmental deregulation and showed that Otawa would ignore its duty to 
consult and accommodate Indigenous people regarding anything that might afect treaty or 
Aboriginal rights.136 In 2011, the Harper government withdrew Canada’s support for the 1997 
Kyoto Protocol.137 
An omnibus bil of 450 pages and deceptively named the Jobs and Growth Act 
introduced changes to the Navigable Waters Protection Act so substantial they amounted to a 
complete overhaul of waterways protection legislation. The renamed Navigation Protection 
Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. N-22) removed no less than 98% of Canadian waterways from federal 
protection. The list of newly exempt waterways included, for instance, six rivers in the 
                             
134 Ibidem. 
135 A.C. Wilox, E. Stephenson, J. Alen, F. Bourque, A. Drossos, S. Elgarøy, M. J. Kral et al., “Examining 
relationships between climate change and mental health in the Circumpolar North.” Regional Environmental 
Change 15, no. 1 (2015): 169-182. 
136 The duty is affirmed in Section Thirty-five of the Constitution Act, 1982 and in various Treaties between the 
(British) Crown in right of Canada and First Nations and Inuit peoples. 
137 Canada and Kyoto: A history of the country's involvement and its greenhouse gas emissions, Canadian 
Broadcasting Corporation, htp:/www.cbc.ca/news2/interactives/canada-kyoto/ Accessed Feb. 19, 2016. 
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Arctic’s Queen Maud Gulf in Nunavut, Canada’s largest jurisdiction in terms of land mass 
and the home of most Canadian Inuit. The Queen Maud Gulf hosts a large migratory bird 
sanctuary that extends from Elice River in the west to Kaleet River in the east. This area has 
been the longtime territory of the Ahiakmiut or Kogmiut or the Pery River people,138 whose 
lives are inextricably bound to the local river systems.139 Hundreds of thousands of waterfowl 
breed in this area, including tundra swans, eider ducks, Ross’s geese, and many other bird 
species.140 
The omnibus bil was one of the triggers for Idle No More (INM), a social movement 
commited to peaceful protest and grounded in Indigenous activism. Its vision was (and is) to 
honour Indigenous sovereignty, and to protect the land and water.141 INM was active in the 
Arctic with activities such as a flash mob at Iqaluit Airport and an outdoor raly in the 
town.142 Many Arctic people were deeply concerned about the federal government’s plans to 
dismantle environmental legislation. 
 
4. Dismantling the dismantling. Conclusions 
Inuit, Dene and others live with the often pernicious impacts of climate change in the 
Arctic. They know that the waterways that suround them are particularly vulnerable to 
adverse effects yet most of these waterways are now unprotected by Canada’s federal 
government. In the face of climate change, these waterways need more protection, not less. 
Reversals to the new bil may occur with the 2015 election of a majority Liberal government 
but there are no solid indications of how or even if this wil happen. 
The original 1985 legislation should be strengthened, not weakened. As part of this 
process, legislators should recognize that the Arctic is an at-risk ecosystem that is changing 
rapidly; thus, its protection should be a priority. The original law assumed a stable ecosystem, 
characterized by predictability; this meant the emphasis was on preservation. But climate 
change research has proven that the Arctic ecosystem is far from stable. New legislation must 
reflect this. Legislative goals need to go beyond preservation to include flexible mechanisms 
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to respond to change that is sometimes fast and possibly devastating. The precautionary 
principle, which has guided activists and legislators for many years, is now insuficient as we 
seek to protect the geophysical environments on which we depend. Thus, preservation of 
certain ecosystems or elements of ecosystems may not be possible yet preservation has to be 
utilized as a first step, always keeping in mind its inadequacy as a response to our curent 
circumstances. 
Rather than ignore fragile environments, such as the Queen Maud Gulf, we should 
adopt a vigilant approach that would have us monitor and study (these environments) al the 
time.143 Craig recommends that climate change be incorporated into al levels of planning, 
from the development of legislation onwards.144 In the case of Nunavut, Canada’s newest 
jurisdiction,145 higher levels of scientific and financial resources are required. 
Equaly important is the recognition of the cultural and emotional significance of the 
Arctic ecosystem. When this ecosystem is threatened or altered, the mental health of the 
people for whom it is home are negatively impacted. Accordingly, the mental health impacts 
of climate change and a changing geophysical environment should motivate legislators. 
Folowing this, governments should include in legislation measures to promote the mental 
health of Arctic people as they cope with the burdens of an unpredictable ecosystem that is 
increasingly shaped by climate change. 
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11.  
On Customary Law. A Cultural Dimension of Ethnopolitical Strategy 
 
Tom G. Svensson 
 
Abstract 
The paper is to shed light on the most cultural perspective concerning aboriginal rights, i.e. 
customary law. The case of the Sámi people's legal perceptions is analysed in context of legal 
struggle regarding recognition of their customary law in the courts in Sweden and Norway. 
 
  1. Introduction 
  The intention of this short comment connected to ´Philosophy of Law in the Arctic´ is 
to shed light on the most cultural perspective concerning aboriginal rights, i.e. customary law. 
Being a legal anthropologist, the notion of legal pluralism and what progress indigenous 
people in the North, especialy the Sámi, so far have atained, motivate such approach. 
 
  2. Customary law 
  Refering to an indigenous rights discourse, customary law emerges as a central 
concept. Al cultures fal back on a legal regime founded on custom, or tradition. According 
to a leading scholar in the field of legal anthropology, Saly Falk Moore, there are three 
meanings connected to customary law; tradition, practice, and legitimization (Moore 1978). 
Understood in this way, customary law is part of culture, it is a legal concept indicating 
cultural diversity as wel as legal diversity, the later aiming at a legal pluralistic arangement. 
In cross-cultural legal contests it serves as an effective ethnic marker, and often appears as a 
necessary requirement when it comes to pursue claims concerning indigenous rights, 
emphasizing cultural uniqueness, the politics of diference. 
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  That which is problematic for indigenous people, whose aim is to make progress in 
their struggle towards improved rights, is the question of recognition. In the courts of most 
majority societies customary law is acknowledged as a legal concept, and as such part of state 
law. However, in the case of indigenous people, their customs and legal perceptions are as a 
rule unwriten. According to the legal establishment this means that such a customary law has 
less evidential power, or value. In making advance concerning their efort to atain 
comprehensive indigenous rights, recognition of customs, legal perceptions is a key factor. 
Specificaly perceived such comprehensive rights contain political, legal, and cultural rights. 
If a people´s customary law is not practiced, comprehensive rights are unlikely to be 
achieved. In other words, culture-specific customary law, or legal regime based on norms 
generated by customs, serves as a political asset for indigenous people in their mobilization 
for claims as wel as in their use of political rhetoric. 
  To be culture-specific and diferent in comparison with oficial state law, does not 
mean that customary law is static and unchangeable. As Moore (Opus.cit.) has stated, 
customary law should be considered as process merging tradition with modernity, thereby 
perceiving customary law as a vital cultural element. 
  Al cultures have customs, which influence behaviour and how communities, large or 
smal, are structured. Some of these customs are law generating, creating set of norms and 
rules of conduct. For indigenous minorities it is essential to build bridges between law and 
culture in order to strengthen their position as a distinct people, and here recognition by an 
outside party, i.e. the larger society, is crucial. If such recognition is not obtained, it wil be 
extremely dificult, for example for the Sámi to refer to customs, their own legal perceptions 
as a source of law. 
  There is no immediate need to have such customary rights codified, but to be 
recognized as a source of law, though mostly unwriten, which should be taken into account 
in legal contests, is decisive. 
  To recognize a people´s customs, customary law, moreover, afirms a recognition of 
culture diference. It is a mater of placing an inter-cultural legal dispute in an appropriate 
cultural context, and adds a dimension to narow jurisprudence. And it is the party 
representing the interests of indigenous people who is responsible for such an additional 
definition of the situation. 
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  Without a cultural repertoire in which customs and legal perceptions have a central 
role in being continualy practiced and valued, stated claims by indigenous people, in 
whatever forum in the majority society, are bound to lack suficient legitimacy. Many recent 
court cases, as wel as Parliamentary Inquiries leading to legislation, actualizing indigenous 
rights, underscore the substantial strength of customary law. 
 
  3. Empirical cases 
  To have additional significance this general discussion should be grounded on some 
empirical case material. Historicaly speaking the “Lappecodicilen” from 1751 is rather 
unique in this sense. This appendage to the Treaty between Denmark/Norway and Sweden 
appears as a most significant document. For the first time Sámi land-use rights based on 
customary use were acknowledged irespective of nation-state borders. This Codicil serves as 
evidence referring to Sámi historical rights, and, moreover, provides symbolic power in 
curent Sámi political actions and rhetoric. And it is important to notice that the Codicil did 
not create new rights, but for the first time in history it officialy recognized and confirmed 
existing rights, in particular applicable for traditional natural resource development. 
  The Codicil is frequently refered to in contemporary court cases, not the least due to 
its historical force. As a legal historical fact its intended content and spirit cannot be denied, 
and, furthermore, it was never extinguished. In that sense this document is unique and serves 
as an asset developing political and legal arguments endorsing the Sámi position as a people. 
  The Alta case in Norway and the Taxed Mountains case in Sweden, both ending with 
Supreme Court Decisions of principle value (1981 and 1982), are confirmations of legal 
nature between the Sámi and the majority society, and which both actualized the implications 
in principle of the Lappecodicilen and of custom, customary land-use. To have an 
unequivocal meaning supporting claims the legal conception, immemorial prescription 
(“urminnes hävd” eler “alders tids bruk”) presupposes a convincing association with the 
Codicil as wel as with customs. 
 In Norway three fairly recent cases can be pointed to, al concluded in the Supreme 
Court, and therefore of great principle value as part of a process creating new law. Al cases 
mentioned alude to decisions in favour of fundamental Sámi interests. 
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  The Seibu case 2000 represents a new legal practice as it recognized the alocation of 
land based on si´da traditions/customs. In this way a new practice enters the legal arena 
where Sámi customs are formaly approved. 
 In the Svartskog case 2001 customary use rights to forestry and pasture, which for 
long had been exercised by a number of sedentary Sámi, turned out momentous against state 
ownership rights. 
  Thirdly, the Selbu case 2001 in the southern part of Sápmi afirmed immemorial 
prescription to a great extent founded on custom and customary rights to reindeer pasture. 
  These three cases confirm that Sámi custom as a prevalent practice represents an 
important principle having an efect on court decisions, when it comes to protect vital Sámi 
interests. The cases, and not the least their conclusions, point to a new legal pluralistic order, 
in particular when it comes to building a bridge between common state law perception and 
special conditions concerning reindeer pastoralism and its viability (Svensson 2003). 
  The Nordmaling case in Sweden 2007 is another example afirming the importance of 
Sámi customs. In this case Sámi customary land-use patern of winter pasturing was 
acknowledged as suficient evidence regarding testimony of Sámi rights against a group of 
land-owning, non-Sámi opponents, who had contested this pasturing practice. This decision 
constitutes a decisive breakthrough for the Sámi in Sweden recognising rights based on 
custom. This case of litigation, 1998 – 2007, concerns three local communities, “samebyar” 
in Västerboten, and final decision was issued by the Court of Appeal in 2007 (Samefolket 
2007). 
 In a recent case, February 3, 2016, the Sámi community Girjas in Swedish Lapland 
was by the District Court in Gälivare ascribed firm rights to hunting and fishing. This verdict 
confirms Sámi exclusive rights to manage the alocation of hunting and fishing rights based 
on immemorial prescription (alders tids bruk), a right formerly administered by the Swedish 
state. This verdict is hold to be a noticeable breakthrough and may appear as a first step 
towards ownership rights (Ságat 2016 Nr 29). 
  The politicization of the notion of customary law was, furthermore, emphasized by 
the Sámi Parliament in Norway as a critical folow up of the Sámi Rights Commission and its 
work on land-use rights (NOU 1997:4). The issue of customs/Sámi legal perceptions, clearly 
stated in the Commission´s mandate, was not dealt with, consequently, in the view of the 
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Sámi, resulting in an incomplete report. According to the Commission this special question 
was considered to be too complicated, demanding new basic research, an undertaking the 
Commission was unable to seriously deal with. Being faced with such a response the Sámi 
Parliament decided to require that such research should be caried out before final legislation, 
a demand favourably met by the Ministry of Justice. In 2001 a new comprehensive report by 
an independent interdisciplinary research group was delivered (NOU 2001:34). In this 
manner the Sámi managed to convert the perspective of traditional knowledge and customary 
rights to an ethnopolitical asset. (See also Proceedings from a conference 1999 Svensson, ed.) 
  As a supplementary result of the Sámi Rights Process in Norway (|980 – 2005) 
leading to legislation, the Finnmark Act 2005, two principal new institutions emerged, first 
the District Court of Inner Finnmark, and second the Commission on Land Resolutions in 
Finnmark. By the District Court, assumed to possess clear competence in Sámi language and 
culture, the Sámi have reached an institution for legal conflict resolutions, which comes close 
to the idea real equality before the law. Its predecessor is the Ofice of Legal Aid of Inner 
Finnmark from 1987, which has been instrumental when it comes to incorporate an 
understanding of Sámi customary law into Norwegian state law (Johnsen 1997), a 
development of a new legal arangement, and which can be perceived as interlegality 
(Hoekema 2006). This institute had no decision-making authority, though, and was 
constrained to prepare cases considering culture diference for an ordinary court. No doubt, 
the District Court represents an appreciable headway, in which Sámi customs, legal 
perceptions are expected to play a natural role. Obviously, such customs appears as a relevant 
factor in the work of the Finnmark Commission with the objective of solving the issue of land 
rights alocation for the entire county of Finnmark. 
 
  4. Summing up 
  As demonstrated customary law is part of comprehensive indigenous rights, the other 
central parts being land rights, rights to self-determination, and human rights. Customary law 
relates to four major perspectives having an effect on a people´s daily life concerns; i.e. 
ecology, politics, legal actions, and culture. 
  To have any weight in political terms, once regained and strengthened, e.g. through 
research, to be included as part of the Sámi political agenda customary rights and custom 
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must be retained and continualy exercised. Its value as evidence in inter-ethnic legal 
confrontations depends on the dynamic, innovative force of customary law, which means 
accepting its oral, unwriten form. 
 It must be established that rights based on custom represents an active cultural 
element, not simply an expression of static tradition. Because it is only in this way that Sámi 
customary law can be ascertained as a source of law. The court cases referred to in this brief 
note ilustrate what can be caled an example of development law, which gradualy verifies 
custom, customary law as suficient proof providing legitimacy to Sámi claims. 
  Folowing the argument presented, a sort of commentary, a people´s customary law is 
part of an ethnopolitical strategy, not the least due to its close connection to culture, in the 
extreme conceived as being engaged in a struggle for cultural survival. 
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12. 
Moral Grounds for Indigenous Hunting Rights 
 
Makoto Usami* 
 
Abstract 
If indigenous people are to have the legal right to hunt a particular species that other citizens 
are denied, then it presents a significant chalenge to philosophers to explore the moral 
grounds that justify the special right, especialy in respect to the issues of normative weight 
and fairness. This exploration is the subject of the curent paper. 
 
  1. Introduction 
It is crucial for indigenous people living in the Arctic to harvest animals by hunting 
in a traditional manner, as is the case with such peoples in other parts of the world. The 
fundamental significance of hunting for native people can be ilustrated by the case of the 
anti-sealing campaigns that environmental and animal rights activists conducted in the 1980s 
and 1990s. Their harsh condemnation, along with a decline in the market price of sealskin 
caused by the increased regard for animal welfare in Western societies, had serious adverse 
impacts on some Inuit populations in Canada. These impacts included malnutrition, poverty, 
reluctant relocation, and the colapse of long-standing culture. Given the nutritional, 
economic, and cultural importance of hunting for aboriginal people, it seems reasonable to 
say that they have the moral right to hunt animals in a sustainable way. Indeed, this right was 
established in a declaration made by a transnational Inuit organization147. 
On the other hand, non-aboriginal people are occasionaly prohibited from hunting a 
particular species of animal in many societies. The rationale for such prohibitions includes 
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the preservation of endangered species, restrictions on human intervention in ecosystem, and 
the protection of animal welfare. The question then arises: why do aboriginal people, unlike 
other citizens, have special hunting rights? There are two issues here. The first concerns 
normative weight: whatever argument justifies restrictions on hunting activities of non-
indigenous citizens, the same argument, at least as a prima facie reason, should also apply to 
indigenous people in order to maintain consistency in moral reasoning. If special native 
hunting rights are ultimately justified, what is a reason against constraints on indigenous 
people’s hunting, which can overide that reason for the constraints? The second issue is that 
of fairness: how can it be fair to exempt only aboriginal people from legal constraints on 
hunting activities, which their felow citizens must obey? 
In the last decades, a growing number of legal, moral, and political philosophers 
have examined the moral foundations of various legal rights and rules governing citizens at 
large. The legal institutions they have studied include property rights, contractual duties, 
freedom of speech, and criminal punishment. If indigenous people are to have the legal right 
to hunt a particular species that other citizens are denied, then it presents a significant 
chalenge to philosophers to explore the moral grounds that justify the special right, 
especialy in respect to the issues of normative weight and fairness. This exploration is the 
subject of the current paper. 
 
  2. Cultural Plurality 
Since native peoples have unique cultures, the idea of cultural plurality seems to be a 
useful point of departure in inquiring into moral justifications for their special hunting rights. 
The position I term the plurality view maintains that a group of people should be provided the 
legal right to sustain their cultural practices, even when other groups are banned from doing 
similar practices, if the right is reasonably expected to enhance the multiplicity and variety of 
subcultures in a society. To acquire this special legal right, the argument goes, the group must 
satisfy two conditions. First, the size of their population is a considerably smal part of the 
whole population of the country in which they live. Let us cal this the population condition. 
Second, their cultural practices, which are supposed to be distinct from those of any other 
groups, have been passed down over hundreds of years. Cal this the duration condition. 
These conditions are met in the case of indigenous peoples’ hunting: they constitute a smal 
portion of the entire population, and they have engaged in hunting in a long inherited manner. 
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The pluralist therefore claims, for example, that Inuit tribes in Canada should be legaly 
alowed to hunt seals even if other citizens are banned from doing so, because this alowance 
admitedly helps to make Canadian society more multicultural. 
The plurality view appears cogent in justifying special aboriginal hunting rights. But 
this appearance is mistaken. To ilustrate how the view can lead to implausible results, 
consider the case of foxhunting in Britain. British foxhunting dates back to the 16th century 
in the modern form in which red foxes are tracked, chased, and kiled by trained foxhounds 
and a group of unarmed folowers led by the master of the foxhounds on horseback. Having 
been practiced until quite recently, the sport was closely associated with the social class 
structure and constituted an important part of rural culture. In recent years, foxhunting was 
increasingly criticized by the animal welfare activists who objected to the cruelty of dogs 
chasing and kiling foxes. Hunting animals with dogs was eventualy banned by law in 
Scotland in 2002 and in England and Wales in 2004. 
Those who practiced foxhunting until the legal prohibition satisfied the population 
conditions the number of fox hunters was considerably smal in the whole population. They 
also met the duration condition: the sport had been enjoyed for several hundred years. 
Therefore, the plurality view implies that the fox hunters were moraly entitled to play their 
sport and that recent statutes banning it violated their entitlement. It is noteworthy that the 
issue here is not whether a blanket legal prohibition of hunting animals with dogs is moraly 
wel-founded. The question is: did fox hunters hold the exclusive moral right to hunt foxes 
with dogs, even if the rest of the population had no right to hunt animals including foxes in 
such a manner? The positive answer to this question, which the plurality view gives, wil 
strike many people as implausible. This counterintuitive result indicates that the pluralist fails 
to explain why British fox hunters had no moral privilege of their traditional form of hunting, 
while Canadian Inuit—and aboriginal peoples in other parts of the world as wel —do have 
such privileges. 
 
  3. Disadvantages and Needs 
There are several notable diferences between British fox hunters and Canadian Inuit 
seal hunters, among which the folowing two are particularly relevant for the purpose of my 
discussion. First, the former group have enjoyed wealth, political influence, and fame in their 
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local communities and the society more broadly, whereas the later have long suffered from 
poverty, political neglect, and stigma. Second, foxhunting was practiced as a luxury sport, 
while seal hunting is conducted as a way to obtain necessities of life. These diferences 
between fox hunters and seal hunters suggest the idea that the right of aboriginal hunting is 
grounded in basic human needs, not cultural plurality. 
The provision view, as I cal it, develops the idea mentioned above by arguing that 
the disadvantaged should be vouchsafed the special legal right to sustain their social practices 
if these practices are necessary and effective in fulfiling their basic needs, such as staple 
foods and daily clothes. This view demands that a group of people fulfil two requirements to 
gain the right. One is the disadvantage condition, which denotes that the group is relatively 
disadvantaged in socioeconomic conditions. The other requirement is the needs condition, 
which means that the group’s social practices constitute a way of meeting its basic needs. 
British fox hunters do not fit the disadvantage condition or the needs condition, whereas 
Canadian Inuit seal hunters satisfy both. By seting forth the two prerequisites, the provision 
view appears to supply solid grounds for the privilege of indigenous subsistence hunting, 
while rejecting that of luxury sport hunting. 
Despite its apparent force, it is dificult for the provision view to pertinently draw 
boundaries of alowable hunting. Consider the case of whaling in Japan. Taiji, a smal coastal 
town isolated by mountains on Honshu Island, has a long history of whaling. Since the early 
17th century at the latest, the local people have hunted and eaten whales. A historical 
background of their traditional whaling is that they had sufered from meager rice crops for 
hundreds of years. The curent inhabitants, who are ethnicaly not aboriginal but Japanese, 
are largely disadvantaged in economic conditions, as are many others who live in coastal 
areas distant from large cities. In 1982, the International Whaling Commission adopted a 
commercial whaling moratorium, which stipulated that the catch limit of whales for 
commercial purposes would be zero from the 1985/1986 season onward. In 1988, Japan 
abandoned commercial whaling practices in accordance with the moratorium. Today some 
whale hunters in Taiji hunt smaler cetaceans in a traditional manner, and others travel out of 
the town to work in the projects of scientific whaling that are authorized by the government 
with special permits. 
Suppose that the inhabitants of Taiji, including whale hunters, passed the referendum 
that al whale meat should be traded and consumed within the town. Do the whale hunters 
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then have the moral claim to resume the hunting of large whales to meet the dietary need of 
the local people?148 The provision view supports rather than rejects their hypothetical claim 
to restore whaling because they satisfy both the disadvantage and needs conditions149. Many 
people wil think, as I do, that this claim is unfounded even though al hunted meat is localy 
consumed. The il-founded result implied by the provision view indicates that the view 
cannot grasp an important diference between Inuit whaling and Taiji whaling. We need to 
identify the difference in order to ofer a robust moral argument for native hunting rights150. 
 
  4. Respect for Indigenous Life 
I have tried to show that neither the plurality view nor the provision view 
successfuly distinguishes between native hunting and some forms of non-native hunting in 
the perspective of moral legitimacy. In other words, these views fail to identify the moral 
values that pertain to the legal right of aboriginal hunting. If I have been corect in assessing 
the two arguments as untenable, this right requires a third one. 
In developing an alternative argument for native hunting entitlements, it is helpful to 
see how its two rivals sufer from dificulties. What both the plurality view and the provision 
view miss seems to be the autonomous character of indigenous life. Aboriginal people are not 
merely patients who are isolated and left behind by the majority of the population in each 
society. They are also agents who endeavour to inherit the cultural legacies of their ancestors, 
to sustain and develop them, and to bequeath them to their descendants, as they are proud of 
their lineage and language. It is true that they are struggling for survival under severe natural 
conditions, but they are also striving for dignity against the majority’s indiference, prejudice, 
and discrimination. The plurality view pays atention to neither of these two aspects of 
                             
148 It is worth noting here that indigenous people are authorized by the IWC to conduct whaling. The so-caled 
aboriginal subsistence whaling is not subject to the commercial moratorium that the commission issued. 
149 Some proponents of the provision view might atempt to diferentiate between Inuit whaling and Taiji 
whaling by referring to the degree of need for hunted animals. The former group of people crucialy relies on 
whale meat for nutrition, while the later has many other foods than whale meat to eat. Given this difference 
between the two groups, the proponents could decline the hypothetical right of Taiji whalers if they made the 
needs condition more stringent by saying that the group’s social practices constitute an indispensable way of 
meeting their nutritional need. The stricter version of the needs condition, however, would deny special hunting 
rights to some native peoples who have been under the influence of the majority’s food culture. Another 
problem with this version is that it would fail to appreciate the non-nutritional elements of aboriginal life, 
including clothes, dwelings, and religious ceremonies. 
150 The plurality view encounters the same difficulty as the provision view does. Since whale hunters in Taiji 
meet both the population condition and the duration condition, it does not reject their hypothetical claim to 
resume whaling. 
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aboriginal people; it looks at only their formal characteristics, such as population size and 
cultural duration. The provision view highlights the patient aspect, while neglecting the agent 
one. In so doing, it fails to explain a moral value involved in special hunting rights as 
distinguished from other legal measures intended to protect the interests of native people. For 
instance, this view wil consider granting the Inuit whaling rights as moraly equivalent to 
giving them food stamps for whale meat because these policies equaly satisfy their 
nutritional requirements. The diference that this view finds between the two is economic: the 
government can save the cost of ful-fledged whaling carried out with advanced technology if 
it alows Inuit tribes to hunt whales by themselves. However, there is indeed a huge moral 
diference between the two mechanisms, which has to do with the agent aspect of native 
people. Special hunting rights indicate the public recognition of and respect for the mode of 
life that they have shaped over many centuries; in contrast, whale meat stamps are simply a 
tool of food supply to the needy. 
Recognizing and respecting aboriginal paterns of life seem to be the key to the 
question of moral foundations of special hunting rights. To develop this basic idea, I propose 
the respect view, according to which a group of people should be accorded the legal right to 
sustain their social practices if the right is reasonably read to convey the society’s oficial 
recognition of and respect for the group’s autonomous way of life on the one hand, and to 
assist them in satisfying their basic needs by themselves on the other hand151. There are two 
prerequisites for this right. First, the autonomy condition states that the group’s social 
practices compose a significant part of the life mode that they have sustained independently 
from other groups in the society for a long period of time. Second, the needs condition, which 
is shared with the provision view, says that the group’s practices constitute a way of 
supplying their basic needs. In virtue of the autonomy condition, the respect view excludes 
the hypothetical Taiji whaling claim from the realm of protected hunting. This is because the 
local people have the contemporary Japanese way of life that has been considerably 
influenced by American culture for several decades, just as those living in other regions do, 
except for their custom of eating whale meat. The respect view also appreciates the moral 
value of whaling rights granted to the Inuit as opposed to whale meat stamps given to them. 
                             
151 The basic argument underlying the respect view is that human life consists of two distinct but interrelated 
aspects: voluntariness and vulnerability. Legal institutions are required to show respect for citizens’ 
voluntariness and to provide rescue to particularly vulnerable groups. I elsewhere present this argument at some 
length. E.g., M. Usami, “Justice after catastrophe: Responsibility and security,” Ritsumeikan Studies in 
Language and Culture, vol. 26, no. 4, 2015, pp. 222-223. 
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Only the former policy makes it possible for indigenous people to meet their dietary need by 
themselves. 
 
  5. Conclusion 
In previous sections, I explored moral grounds for exclusive legal hunting rights of 
indigenous peoples. To begin with, I examined the plurality view, which advances these 
rights by invoking the idea of multiple and various subcultures in a society. As I showed, this 
view fails to grasp the realities of aboriginal life because of its formalist approach, which 
utilizes the group’s population size and cultural duration as prerequisites for the special 
rights. Its failure is exemplified by the fact that it does not diferentiate foxhunting played as 
a sport by the wealthy British from seal hunting caried out for the daily necessity by Inuit 
populations. 
The next target of my investigation was the provision view, which finds raison d’être 
of special hunting rights in meeting basic needs of the rights-holder group. This view 
corectly distinguishes between British foxhunting and Inuit sealing by taking a substantive 
approach that focuses on the socioeconomic (dis)advantages and material needs of a group in 
question. By centering its atention on human vulnerability and necessity, however, this view 
misses the agency aspect of native people. Its oversight is evident when it makes no 
distinction between the case of Taiji people’s hypothetical claim of restored whaling and that 
of Inuit tribe’s demand of traditional whaling, in both of which the disadvantaged have 
hunted and eaten the same species of animal to make their livelihood. 
Based on my negative assessment of the plurality view and the provision view, I 
ofered the respect view, which bases hunting rights of aboriginal peoples both on the 
recognition of and respect for their autonomously shaped mode of life and on the satisfaction 
of their basic needs. This view denies the supposed foxhunting right by taking the group’s 
needs into account; it also declines the hypothetical claim of Taiji whaling by demanding 
autonomy of the group. Moreover, it draws a clear line of demarcation between granting 
native people whaling rights and giving them stamps for whale meat. 
I have discussed the exclusive legal right to hunt a particular species that indigenous 
people have. But the basic line of my argument can be applied to the right to fish and the 
right to gather plants, if its details are appropriately changed. More generaly, I hope that the 
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point of my discussion has relevance to other adopted or proposed legal rights and rules 
relating to aboriginal people in various societies, ranging from native language education to 
parliamentary seat quotas. Special rights granted to indigenous people are worthwhile only 
when they express the society’s recognition of and respect for the mode of life that they have 
autonomously shaped and sustained on one hand, and empower them to tackle chalenges in 
their realities on the other. 
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13. 
Status of Indigenous Peoples in International Law 
 
Agnieszka Szpak 
 
Abstract 
The article briefly examines the most relevant representative factors of the status of 
indigenous peoples in light of international law with special references to the Sami rights. 
 
  1. Introduction 
For many years indigenous peoples, their needs, rights, culture and identity have been 
neglected and destroyed. These biter remarks also refer to the Sami in the Arctic. This 
situation is slowly changing in practice while on paper in the international instruments both 
of ‘hard law’ and ‘soft law’ one may find provisions ensuring respect for the rights of 
indigenous people such as inter alia right to self-determination, to respect for their traditions 
and customs, cultures and languages, to participate in decision-making on maters that would 
afect their rights, land rights, to the improvement of their social and economic position or to 
maintain and develop their traditional knowledge. Many of those rights are guaranteed in the 
non-binding UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples152 (hereinafter: UN 
Declaration) adopted in 2007 and legaly binding ILO Convention 169 on Indigenous and 
Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries153. Below a few remarks wil be devoted to the UN 
Declaration. With reference to the ILO Convention it should just be added that it aims to 
protect the rights of indigenous peoples, their way of life and their culture. Its adoption was at 
that time (in 1989) an improvement compared to the previous Convention 107 of 1957 on the 
Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in 
Independent Countries154 which aimed at assimilation of indigenous peoples. One may 
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152 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UN GA res. 61/295) is available at 
htp:/research.un.org/en/docs/ga/quick/regular/61 (29.01.2016). 
153 The ILO Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries is available at 
htp:/www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0:NO:P12100_ILO_CODE:C169 
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Populations in Independent Countries is available 
at htp:/www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0:NO:P12100_INSTRUMENT_ID:312252 
(29.01.2016). 
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conclude that there are legal provisions protecting the indigenous peoples, but unfortunately 
law in books does not always transform into law in action. 
 
2. Indigenous Peoples and the right to self-determination 
In 1994 the UN General Assembly declared years 1995-2004 the International Decade 
of the World’s Indigenous Peoples155. The second decade (2005-2015) was the continuation 
of the first one156. The first decade was supposed to be crowned by the issuance of the UN 
declaration on indigenous peoples but this happened in the middle of the second decade when 
in 2007 the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples was adopted. 
UN Declaration is the most important, however non-binding, instrument on the rights 
of indigenous peoples. It affirms that indigenous peoples contribute to the diversity and 
richness of civilizations and cultures, which constitute the common heritage of humankind157. 
According to the Declaration, indigenous peoples have a colection of rights: individual ones 
that persons have as members of the group and colective ones that inhere in the group as a 
whole (such as land rights) (Art. 1 of the UN Declaration). Art. 3 refers to the right of self-
determination of indigenous peoples which means the ability to freely determine their 
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development. Self-
determination is connected to the right to autonomy or self-governance in maters relating to 
internal and local afairs of indigenous peoples (Art. 4 of the UN Declaration). This formula 
indicates that self-determination should be exercised first of al in the form of autonomy. To 
make things even clearer the UN Declaration contains a clause stating that Nothing in this 
Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, people, group or person any right 
to engage in any activity or to perform any act contrary to the Charter of the United Nations 
or construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, 
totaly or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent 
States (Art. 46). Many States fear that according to the indigenous peoples, the right to self-
determination may lead to secession. Those fears are however unjustified as indigenous 
peoples do not want to create a separate State but be able to make free and independent 
                             
155 UN GA res. 48/163 of 21 December 1993 is available at htp:/research.un.org/en/docs/ga/quick/regular/48 
(29.01.2016). 
156 UN GA res. 59/174 of 20 December 2004 is available at htp:/research.un.org/en/docs/ga/quick/regular/59 
(29.01.2016). 
157 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, preamble. 
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decisions in their own maters158. Consequently, indigenous peoples have the right to 
maintain and strengthen their distinct political, legal, economic, social and cultural 
institutions, while retaining their right to participate fuly, if they so choose, in the political, 
economic, social and cultural life of the State (Art. 5 of the UN Declaration). But as Erica-
Irene Daes, the former Chairperson of the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations 
stated, there is no distinction between indigenous and other peoples, save the indigenous 
people have not been able to exercise the right to self-determination159. 
 
3. Indigenous Peoples and the land rights 
The UN Declaration takes into account the special relationship of indigenous peoples to 
their lands. It should be recaled that when the incomers arived indigenous lands were 
regarded terra nulius. This doctrine has been rightly rejected by the International Court of 
Justice in the Western Sahara case of 1975160. Those lands were obviously not terra nulius 
and as N. Oskal rightly claims, Saami customary rights to the usage of land and water, like 
any other usage right, are established and based on age-old use, and do not rest on the law 
alone161. In accordance with Art. 25, Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and 
strengthen their distinctive spiritual relationship with their traditionaly owned or otherwise 
occupied and used lands, territories, waters and coastal seas and other resources and to 
uphold their responsibilities to future generations in this regard. The relationship between 
                             
158 L.-A. Baer, The Rights of Indigenous Peoples – A Brief Introduction in the Context of the Sámi, 
„International Journal on Minority and Group Rights” 2005, no. 12, p. 257; O. Ch. Okafor, Entitlement, Process, 
and Legitimacy in the Emergent International Law of Secession, „International Journal on Minority and Group 
Rights” 2002, no. 9, p. 41-70. 
159 L.-A. Baer, op.cit., p. 255. 
160 The ICJ stated that at the time of colonization by Spain Western Sahara was not terra nulius (para. 75). In 
para. 80 of the advisory opinion the ICJ stated: Whatever diferences of opinion there may have been among 
jurists, the State practice of the relevant period indicates that territories inhabited by tribes or peoples having a 
social and political organization were not regarded as terrae nulius. It shows that in the case of such territories 
the acquisition of sovereignty was not generaly considered as efected unilateraly through "occupation" of 
terra nulius by original title but through agreements concluded with local rulers. On occasion, it is true, the 
word "occupation" was used in a non-technical sense denoting simply acquisition of sovereignty; but that did 
not signify that the acquisition of sovereignty through such agreements with authorities of the country was 
regarded as an "occupation" of a "terra nulius 'in the proper sense of these terms. On the contrary, such 
agreements with local rulers, whether or not considered as an actual "cession" of the territory, were regarded 
as derivative roots of title, and not original titles obtained by occupation of terrae nulius. The Western Sahara 
advisory opinion is available at 
htp:/www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=4&k=69&case=61&code=sa&p3=4 (29.01.2016). 
161 N. Oskal, Political Inclusion of the Saami as Indigenous People in Norway, „International Journal on 
Minority and Group Rights” 2001, no. 8, p. 261. See also: A. Eide, Legal and Normative Bases for Saami 
Claims to Land in the Nordic, „International Journal on Minority and Group Rights” 2001, no. 8, p. 137. On the 
social structure of the Sami see: M. Ahrén, Indigenous Peoples’ Culture, Customs, And Traditions And 
Customary Law-The Saami People’s Perspective, “Arizona Journal of International & Comparative Law” 2004, 
vol. 21, no. 1, p. 65-73. 
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the Sami and nature is regarded in a holistic and integrated way. Lands are important as the 
Sami have used them with their forests and lakes for hunting, reindeer husbandry, fishing and 
extracting raw materials162. Art. 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (1966), which is a binding international treaty, states that In those States in which 
ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shal not 
be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own 
culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language163. Human 
Rights Commitee has pointed out that the right to culture from Art. 27 includes a right to 
traditional lands and teritories164. In its General comment no. 23 the Commitee stated that 
With regard to the exercise of the cultural rights protected under article 27, the Commitee 
observes that culture manifests itself in many forms, including a particular way of life 
associated with the use of land resources, specialy in the case of indigenous peoples. That 
right may include such traditional activities as fishing or hunting and the right to live in 
reserves protected by law165. 
Many times the UN Declaration emphasises the necessity of free, prior and informed 
consent of the indigenous peoples for actions or enterprises that might afect their rights 
(Arts. 10, 11 (2), 19, 26 (2), 28 (1), 29 (2), 32 (2). For the Sami, who live in four diferent 
States (Sweden, Norway, Finland and Russia166), it is important to be able to maintain and 
develop relations and cooperation in spiritual, political, cultural, social and economic spheres 
with other Sami and other peoples across borders. Such a right is granted in Art. 36 of the UN 
Declaration. 
 
  4. Conclusions 
 For many years indigenous peoples have been marginalized in national and 
international politics. Since about 1980, however, international community became interested 
in indigenous peoples and started to recognize their rights and needs and regulate their status 
                             
162 L.-A. Baer, op.cit., p. 248. 
163 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is available at: 
htp:/www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx (29.01.2016). 
164 See: Bernard Ominayak, Chief of the Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada (1984) available at 
htp:/www1.umn.edu/humanrts/undocs/session45/167-1984.htm, Kitok v. Sweden (1985) available at 
htp:/www1.umn.edu/humanrts/undocs/197-1985.html, Länsman et al v. Finland (2001) available at 
htp:/www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CCPR/Pages/CCPRIndex.aspx (29.01.2016). 
165 General comment 23, para. 7, available at htp:/tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/ 
TBSearch.aspx?Lang=en&TreatyID=8&DocTypeID=11 (29.01.2016). See also: H. P. Graver, G. Ulfstein, The 
Sami People’s Right to Land in Norway, „International Journal on Minority and Group Rights”, 2004, no. 11, p. 
343. 
166 For more details see: L.-A. Baer, op.cit., p. 247. 
112 
 
in international law. Despite al the eforts and international instruments that were adopted, 
the legal, social, economic and cultural situation of indigenous peoples, the Sami including, is 
far from perfect. Their special needs such as specific and almost sacred relationship with their 
lands and their right to maintain and develop their culture, customs, language and education 
must be respected. International community should appreciate and respect traditional 
knowledge and customs of indigenous peoples as the later definitely is a part of the cultural 
heritage of mankind. Indigenous people should be recognized as subject of international law 
with rights to self-determination, self-governance and self-identification167. 
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14. 
Arctic Frost? Understanding Inuit Ambiguity towards Idle No More 
 
Maura Hanrahan 
 
Abstract 
 This chapter explores apparent Inuit ambiguity towards Idle No More. The Indigenous 
movement was founded in Canada in 2010 to protest the Conservative government’s atempts 
to erode Indigenous sovereignty and reduce federal environmental protection, including in the 
Arctic, through omnibus legislation. Inuit perspectives on the movement are complex and 
reflect Inuit culture, priorities, and pressing realities. 
 
  1. Introduction to Idle No More 
Idle No More is a global social movement founded in Canada in 2010, commited to 
peaceful protest grounded in Indigenous activism. Its vision is to honour Indigenous 
sovereignty, and to protect the land and water.168 The Jobs and Growth Act, an omnibus bil 
introduced by Canada’s former Conservative federal government, triggered an escalation of 
Idle No More activities in 2012. The Act dismantled much of Canada’s environmental 
protection legislation, including in the Inuit Arctic, and increased Otawa’s ongoing atacks 
on Indigenous autonomy and sovereignty. 
 
  2. Inuit Ambiguity toward Idle No More 
 Despite the new legislation’s potential adverse effects on the Arctic, Inuit 
demonstrated an apparent reluctance to engage fuly with Idle No More. Some Inuit, 
however, supported the movement. For instance, on December 21, 2012 an Idle No More 
flash mob at Iqaluit Airport, Nunavut drew twenty-five people who drummed and sang.169 
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Almost a month later, an outdoor raly of forty people took place in Iqaluit and an Inuit public 
interest group caled Makita announced its solidarity with Idle No More.170 Further, 
representatives from Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated (NTI), the entity that manages the 
Inuit land-claim agreement in Nunavut, met with the hunger-striking chief of Atawapiskat 
First Nation, Theresa Spence, who was linked to Idle No More. NTI also issued a media 
release that criticized Otawa for failing to live up to its obligations to Indigenous people, 
including environmental monitoring in the Arctic.171 In 2006 NTI had sued the Crown on the 
same basis; NTI won the case along with almost $15 milion in damages.172 NTI president 
Cathie Towtongie said, In Nunavut, the government of Canada has failed to implement our 
modern day agreements in many respects.173 
Yet there was considerable evidence of Inuit ambiguity toward Idle No More. NTI’s 
public statement in support of Idle No More masked its support for legislative changes made 
by the Conservative government. NTI stood with Otawa as it amended the Nunavut land-
claim agreement in 2008, efectively removing the territory from the Canadian 
Environmental Assessment Act. NTI also supported a further streamlining of the 
environmental review process in the Arctic through the Nunavut Planning and Project 
Assessment Act, an omnibus bil known and marketed as the Northern Jobs and Growth Act. 
Pointing out that Inuit are not First Nations,174 Tery Audla, president of the national 
Inuit organization, Inuit Tapirit Kanatami (ITK), expressed his reluctance about Idle No 
More in a commentary in the National Post, a right-leaning southern Canadian newspaper 
with wide distribution. He wrote As with our modern Inuit land-claim agreements, we believe 
that the Crown should beter honour the historic numbered treaties signed with First Nations. 
. . Then he added: As the national Inuit leader, I could be in permanent outrage mode with 
the Crown. But instead of casting the relationship between the Canadian government and its 
indigenous peoples in black-and-white terms, I would prefer to commend Environment 
Canada oficials, and our Canadian ambassadors abroad. They are helping batle Goliath, 
both in our atempt to chalenge a European Union seal ban in EU courts, and to counter 
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172 Author unknown, Inuit side with Idle No More, say movement an opportunity to honour land claims, Metro 
Otawa, January 10, 2013, Accessed htp:/www.metronews.ca/news/otawa/2013/01/10/inuit-side-with-idle-no-
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174 First Nations are formerly known as Indians and are not related in terms of culture or descent to Inuit, the 
Indigenous people of the Circumpolar region. 
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eforts to list polar bears as endangered. . .For Inuit, that means puting food on the table. . . 
Inuit support the movement but we’re a pragmatic people.175 Some of Audla’s sentiments 
were shared by the editors of the Nunavut newspaper Nunatsiaq Online who opined: Idle No 
More’s unifying principle is the idea that aboriginal people are sovereign nations who have 
yet to surrender their sovereignty to Canada. . .But no oficialy recognized Inuit 
organization within Canada asserts such an ideology. . .That’s no commonality. It’s a stark, 
irreconcilable diference.176 Nunatsiaq Online went further, labeling Idle No More 
incoherent and chaotic and caling Chief Spence’s hunger strike a bizarre sideshow.177 
 
  3. Legislation and Protest: Understanding Inuit Dilemmas in the Canadian 
Context 
It is unreasonable to expect Inuit to speak with one voice. At first glance, it seems that 
many grassroots Inuit, especialy those who live in southern Canadian cities, saw Idle No 
More as a good opportunity. Leaders like Tery Audla seemed to have a more negative view 
of the movement and NTI gave out mixed messages. The conflicting messages from Inuit 
organizations and groups about Idle No More were striking, especialy as compared to the 
near consensus among First Nations organizations and groups. 
How do we understand apparent Inuit ambiguity to Idle No More? Clearly, Inuit quite 
rightly expect their land-claims agreements to be respected, which is a similar goal to that of 
most First Nations Idle No More supporters. The aspirations of both Inuit and First Nations 
are political in nature, reflecting a desire to return to some form of self-government, but there 
is a philosophical diference too large to ignore. For Inuit, autonomy can happen within 
Canada; for many First Nations, the aim is self-government alongside Canada with 
citizenship linked to, for instance, the Oneida, Mohawk or Cree nation.178 In contrast, ITK’s 
slogan is Canadians First, First Canadians and Inuit from the Canadian Arctic and sub-
Arctic see themselves as “Canadian Inuit” when they meet with Inuit from elsewhere in the 
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Circumpolar region.179 With Idle No More making its opposition to the Canadian state 
abundantly clear, Inuit leaders had litle choice but to critique the movement and refrain from 
wholeheartedly embracing it. 
Another related reason for Inuit ambiguity lies in high-context Inuit culture, 
specificaly methods of dealing with conflict. Inuit respond to conflict by privileging 
necessity and actions determined by the demands of what we could cal honour.180 Thus, Inuit 
deal with conflict by considering what can be done and what needs to be done and then using 
ritual communication based upon feelings and aesthetics. When conflict occurs, even if it is 
of criminal nature, an important goal is to restore harmony and peace in the community.181 
Reflecting these values, the government of Nunavut, while a public, rather than Inuit, 
government is a consensus government, which means that members are independent of 
political parties and the tone of debate in the House should be courteous. According to former 
member Hunter Tootoo,182 Although unanimous agreement is not required for decisions in 
the Legislative Assembly, unanimity is a desirable outcome.183 As Tery Audla said with 
reference to Idle No More, Inuit are pragmatic. Litigation sits uneasily with Inuit culture, as 
does protest. While this may look like simple conflict aversion to observers, it is more 
complicated than this. 
As ITK leader Tery Audla said with reference to Idle No More, Inuit are pragmatic. 
One of the things that makes Inuit responses complex is the health status, in the broadest 
terms, of Inuit in Canada. Inuit health status, reflecting multiple multi-generational trauma 
caused by loss of land, loss of language, forced residential schooling, and myriad other 
assimilationist policies, is alarmingly low. Inuit have higher total cardiovascular mortality 
than Europeans and other North Americans.184 Injuries, intentional and unintentional, are an 
important cause of death185 and there is a prevalent patern of adolescent suicide.186 In 
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addition, many Inuit are exposed to food and water contaminants, including lead and 
mercury,187 and many experience chronic water insecurity188 and, related to this, food 
insecurity.189 Added to this is the mental health burden resulting from climate change.190 
These things interupt the Inuit relationship with the land and sea, from which Inuit identity 
and health are derived. So, given the number and extent of these problems, at times Inuit are 
forced to resort to litigation, as NTI did in 2006. They take part in the adversarial British-
Canadian justice system with the ful knowledge that their preferences lie elsewhere; 
extrapolating from Terry Audla, we learn that Inuit eschew overt conflict and would rather 
concentrate on whatever needs to be done to put food on the table. In promising improved 
socio-economic conditions through industrial development with enabling legislation as a 
starting point, Canada’s Conservative government forced NTI’s hands more than once. 
 
  4. Conclusion 
The National Post and other right-leaning media outlets in Canada atempted to 
exploit aleged divisions between Indigenous people over Idle No More as a way of 
discrediting the movement. But they failed to understand the complexity of Inuit responses to 
the realities of life in the Arctic. In addition, given the Canadian tendency to conflate Inuit 
with First Nations, who are much more numerous and visible, Inuit have to assert themselves 
through emphasizing diferences in culture, priorities, and goals. Thus Inuit ambiguity toward 
Idle No More can be explained not in terms of political agendas but in terms of cultural 
diferences, prefered strategies and priorities, given the urgencies in the Arctic. 
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15. 
Notes on Using Film to Engage with Philosophy of Law in the Arctic 
 
Rebecca Johnson 
 
Abstract 
In this note, I comment on my experience of using film as a tool for engaging with 
philosophy of law in the Arctic. 
 
  1. Introduction 
 For several years, I have been teaching a legal theory course caled “Northern 
Jurisprudence: Inuit Law and Film”.191 In this note, I comment on my experience of using 
film as a tool for engaging with philosophy of law in the Arctic. I begin with the impetus for 
the course, point to the theoretical structure that informs the course, and then detail the course 
content. Film is the primary text, but it is supplemented by traditional Inuit stories, Inuit art, 
case law, the words of Inuit elders, and writings by Inuit and Qalunaat academics and 
activists. 
 
  2. The Impetus and the Chalenge 
 I teach at University of Victoria Faculty of Law, situated at the tip of Vancouver 
Island, at Canada’s most southern border. It is a place where significant legal and political 
energy has been invested in ongoing efforts to de-colonize Canadian structures of law. An 
oft-articulated observation in decolonization scholarship concerns the powerful role played 
by southern (and by this, I mean ‘Western’) concepts of law and philosophy in the work of 
Empire over the past several hundred years. It has been al too common for southern theorists 
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and politicians to read the northern ways of life against the background of southern 
presumptions about state-centred legality, hierarchy, civilization and progress. Here, one risks 
reading the north and its people as bereft of both philosophy and law. 
  This is, of course, a familiar refrain. One need always to be working reflexively on the 
limits of one’s own philosophical imagination, particularly in the context of linguistic and 
cultural diference. But theorists from the south do face a particularly chalenging horizon. 
How does one engage respectfuly and deeply with the Arctic societies and peoples who have 
inhabited the land (‘the people’), given the extreme dificulties posed by the very geography 
and physicality of the Arctic itself (‘the land’)? Atempts to move beyond one’s own 
assumptions about philosophy of law in the Arctic are complicated given the dificulty and 
expense of visiting the far north, let alone managing to learn through immersion in the 
lifeways of Inuit/Arctic landscapes and communities. 
 
  3. Theoretical Structure Informing the Work 
 It is for the above reasons that “story” offers such potential to philosophers.  
Indigenous theorists and cultural theorists have certainly emphasized the importance of 
stories as tools for thinking, as opportunities to inhabit other philosophies, as ways to imagine 
what it is to live in other worlds.192 Stories can facilitate forms of engagement with both land 
and people, particularly when travel and face-to-face contact is not an easy possibility.  
  Stories ofer a space of mediated experience. As Edward Saïd argues in Culture and 
Imperialism,193 stories are powerful sites for critical analysis, for doing the work of making 
visible hidden structures of thought. He argues that it is in the world of fiction that we can 
access the ‘structures of feeling’ that most strongly hold a people to a set of deep 
philosophical commitments, even when one might say those commitments are, in fact, 
toxic.194 Saïd focuses on the 19th century British novel, as a way of making visible the 
philosophies of empire that lay deep at the heart of many western societies. This theoretical 
approach informs the use of film in the Northern Jurisprudence course.  
 
                             
192 See V. Napoleon and H. Friedland. "An Inside Job: Engaging with Indigenous Legal Traditions through 
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  4. The Course 
  The course explores Inuit philosophy of law, including philosophies concerning 
relationships, land, animals, consumption and cosmology. I rely primarily on films made in 
the north, by northern directors. I draw on stories of the past and stories of the present, 
conscious of Saïd’s argument that stories about the past are particular kinds of arguments 
about the present. We begin with Robert Flaherty’s Nanook of the North to frame southern 
visions of the north. We then turn to the Igloolik Isuma trilogy (Atanarjuat, The Journals of 
Knud Rasmussen and Before Tomorrow), where each film can be understood as a present 
argument about the past. Those films can sit alongside documentaries situated expressly in 
the present, and dealing explicitly with law, and the impacts of colonization on Inuit 
communities (Kikkik – E1-472, The Experimental Eskimo, Tunnit: Retracing the Lines of 
Inuit Tatoos, Martha of the North, Arctic Defenders, and Qalunaat!: Why White People Are 
Funny). Case law and commentary is also drawn into the frame of reference.195 
  There is a rich contemporary literature on ‘cinematic’ elements in film (sound, sight, 
editing), and the ways that they can help one access the “structures of feeling” that are closely 
linked to the afective power of philosophies of law.196 I do not argue that these techniques 
capture philosophical truths in any straightforward or unmediated way. Rather, the argument 
is that films are rich texts ofering a helpfuly complicated terain for philosophical work; 
these texts enable a more robust simultaneous engagement with ways of knowing that are 
resident in narative structures, audio tracks and visual fields.197 
  The goal has been less to identify what law or philosophy is in the North, than to find 
a scafold to ask different questions about law and philosophy. The aim is to hold open a 
larger space of uncertainty, in order to loosen the power of un-interogated southern 
presumptions about how notions of legality, cosmology and philosophy are woven together. 
Al cultures have interpretive bounds: some interpretations, while creative, fal further from 
the centre. It is important to atend to a range of interpretations made by authoritative 
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knowledge holders throughout a culture. In using film to do philosophy of law in the Arctic, 
it is thus important to triangulate, to use multiple sources.198 
  One important source is the voice of Inuit elders.199 Elders provide important 
commentary on philosophies informing understandings of traditional law, child raising, 
health and cosmology. Often, philosophy is most visible when approaching it by indirection. 
In the interviews, one can feel the current of philosophical commitments in discussions about 
dogs, hunting, material culture, songs, games, family paterns, and naming. I note that many 
curent debates about traditional knowledge involve atempts by elders to transmit important 
knowledge to youth.200 These interviews make explicit a number of philosophical 
presumptions about the nature of knowledge and experience, amongst them, that there are 
important insights in Inuit ways of knowing and thinking, and that this knowledge can be 
learned. Significant acts of translation may be required for this learning to happen, but 
contemporary scholarship by southern and northern academics and activists helps to ground 
the acts of translation that are enabled by a story/film based approach to philosophy of law.201  
  Given the frequency with which elders teach using story, traditional Inuit stories are 
also incorporated into the course.202 In some cases, the stories are drawn explicitly into 
particular films, and thus the stories require exploration on their own terms. In other contexts, 
being familiar with a richer bank of stories opens up new possibilities in the films. 
 I also turn to questions of art more generaly. The world of art and image has always 
been a place that captures deep philosophical presumptions in a culture, and thus, it is helpful 
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Johnson, “Justice and the Colonial Colision: Reflections on Stories of Intercultural Encounter in Law, 
Literature, Sculpture and Film.” No Foundations: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Law and Justice, 2012, vol. 9 
p. 68. htp:/www.helsinki.fi/nofo/NoFo9JOHNSON.html 
199 See, for example, the five volume series Interviewing Inuit Elders. We drew particularly from M. 
Aupilaarjuk, et al. Interviewing Inuit Elders, Vol. 2: Perspectives on Traditional Law, edited by J. Oosten et al, 
Nunavut Arctic Colege, 1999. See also J. Bennet and S. Rowley (eds.), Uqalurait: An Oral History of 
Nunavut, McGil-Queen's University Press, 2004. 
200 J. Oosten, and F.B. Laugrand, (eds.), Surviving in Diferent Worlds: Transferring Inuit Traditions from 
Elders to Youth, Nunavut Arctic Colege, 2012. 
201 I draw here on J.B. White, Justice as Translation: An Essay in Cultural and Legal Criticism, University of 
Chicago Press, 1990. 
202 See htp:/www.uvic.ca/law/about/indigenous/indigenouslawresearchunit/ for more information on the 
Indigenous Law Research Unit, and their methodologies for working with indigenous stories. See also H. 
Friedland and V. Napoleon, "Gathering the Threads: Developing a Methodology for Researching and 
Rebuilding Indigenous Legal Traditions," Lakehead Law Journal, 2015, vol. 1, at 16.  For a working paper 
outlining the beginnings of such a project dealing with Western Inuit stories, see L. Groft and R. Johnson, 
"Journeying North: Reflections on Inuit Stories as Law." Commissioned by the Indigenous Bar Association - 
Accessing Justice and Reconciliation Project, University of Victoria - Indigenous Legal Research Unit, 2014. 
For more on this method, see also J. Borrows, Drawing out Law: A Spirit's Guide, University of Toronto Press, 
2011. 
127 
 
to draw in work on Inuit sculpture and design principles. One can see the imprint of Inuit 
philosophy in the arts, be that print-making, sculpture, clothing, or singing.  This is true of 
both the substance of the art works produced (the stories captured or invoked) and of the 
materials in which the art is rendered.203 
 
  5. Conclusion 
 In her MA thesis, Inuk scholar Jackie Price explores central intelectual and political 
philosophies, and arguments about the ways those philosophies link to contemporary 
adaptations. 204 As she notes, curent adaptations, like past adaptations, are largely about ways 
of living wel in the world. In making sense of curent pressures, she looks to language, to 
film (using the Nunavut: Our Land video series), to reflections on conversations with parents 
about the past, and to kitchen table conversations. Drawing on al of these threads, she 
focuses on the chalenges of ‘detangling’ Inuit and Western understandings of law, life, 
responsibility, connection, and more. 
  My argument lies in a similar track. Film can play a role in this detangling. It can 
enable one to experience a diferent feeling of time and space. It can enable a richer 
intercultural encounter,205 helping viewers to make sense of relationships between people of 
the land and people with their own histories and pasts, their own cosmologies and 
philosophies of law. The film course operates through triangulation, using contemporary film 
making, case law, traditional stories, practices of art, interviews with elders, and work by 
Inuit and Qalunaat scholars as a way of enabling southern scholars to more respectfuly and 
successfuly be part of discussions about philosophy of law in the Arctic. This is of course 
only a beginning. Film cannot provide definitive answers to questions about philosophy of 
law in the Arctic. But it can provide a vehicle for imaginatively inhabiting stories in order to 
beter understand the philosophies that inform those ways of living. 
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16. 
Custom Rising: Indigenous Law and Legal Philosophy as Catalysts for Intercultural 
Justice and Good Global Governance 
 
Brendan Tobin 
 
Abstract 
After hundreds of years of marginalization Indigenous legal regimes are undergoing 
resurgence in many parts of the world. A growing recognition of Indigenous law as an 
important source of law and legal philosophy presents opportunities for Indigenous peoples to 
play a more proactive role in Arctic law making.  
 
 1. Introduction 
  For almost two hundred years Indigenous peoples’ legal regimes have been 
marginalized, distorted and displaced by positive (stipulated) law. The efect has been a 
‘massive juridicide’ of legal practices and conceptions that do not fit within the modern 
positivist legal canon.206 The dominance of positive law has undermined the traditional 
balance between what were traditionaly seen as the three primary sources of law: natural 
law, customary law and positive law. The resultant lopsided global and national legal orders 
have proven incapable of preventing and have indeed exacerbated the extreme economic, 
environmental and social chalenges, threatening the earth today. 
  According to the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues there are 
around 5,000 distinct Indigenous peoples in more than 70 countries each of which may have 
distinct legal regimes.207 These thousands of customary legal regimes make up the vast 
majority of global juridiversity. This diversity may prove a vital resource in the search for 
inspiration in the development of legal measures to help rebuild the necessary links between 
humankind and the natural world upon which we depend. Similarly, the laws and legal 
philosophy of Indigenous peoples may help in recovering the sense of community and 
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responsibility necessary to secure regulation of the financial sector and prevent continuing 
destruction of the environment for personal and corporate gain. As with biological, cultural 
and linguistic diversity, the protection of global juridiversity seems crucial for our long-term 
wel-being. 
 In the past thirty years or so advances in human rights, constitutional law and the 
advocacy by and on behalf of Indigenous peoples has led to a ‘resurgence’ of Indigenous 
law208, which is reshaping national and global legal orders. This is apparent in the increased 
recognition of Indigenous peoples’ legal regimes as a source of law and of their rights to 
regulate their internal afairs according to their own laws. It is also apparent in the growing 
influence of Indigenous law and legal philosophy on national law in particular constitutional 
law and its influence on judicial decision making. Al of which is fueling intercultural justice 
and equity. 
 
  2. Customary law, juridiversity and Indigenous legal philosophy 
 Indigenous peoples’ legal regimes are rooted in relationships between people, 
community, land, resources, spirituality and culture. This notion of law as an integral part of 
the cultural and spiritual life and wel being of the community is reflected in legal principles 
such as ‘reciprocity, duality and equilibrium’ found in Indigenous peoples legal regimes from 
Peru to China.209 Amongst the most intriguing principles of Indigenous legal philosophy is 
the notion of law as harmony. Raymond Austin, a former justice on the Navajo Nation 
Supreme Court, describes the most important Navajo legal principle of hozho as 
a state (in the sense of condition) where everything, tangible and intangible, is in its 
proper place and functioning wel with everything else, such that the condition 
produced can be described as peace, harmony and balance (for lack of beter English 
terms).210 
  Disharmony represents a divergence from the law and the role of law is to return the 
community to harmony. The importance of harmony between humankind and nature is an 
important feature of Sami and Inuit customary laws.211 The notion of the law as a tool for 
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securing harmony rather than retribution stands in contrast to dominant legal regimes, giving 
greater primacy to colective rather than individualistic rights and a focus on restoration of 
community wel-being.212 This focus on restorative justice means Indigenous peoples and 
local communities’ legal regimes tend to be structural and procedural, rather than substantive 
and rule-oriented, giving customary law a flexibility and dynamism which enables individual 
cases to be addressed on their merits.213 
 
  3. The growing stature of Indigenous law 
 Indigenous peoples’ rights to regulate their afairs in accordance with their own laws, 
customs and traditions, is grounded in common article 1 of the 1966 United Nations 
International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and Economic Social and Cultural 
Rights, which recognizes the rights of al “peoples” to self-determination. The United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples adopted in 2007 recognises indigenous 
peoples as ‘peoples’ with rights of self-determination214 entitled to autonomy over their 
internal afairs.215 Although not legaly binding, of itself, the Declaration is widely viewed as 
a true representation of the status Indigenous peoples’ rights under international law, 
including unwriten customary international law. International Labour Organization, (ILO) 
Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, which has been 
ratified by 22 states including Norway,216 is legaly binding on those states. The Convention 
obliges states to secure Indigenous and Tribal peoples’ participation in decision-making 
processes affecting them217 and to give due regard to their customs or customary laws when 
applying national laws and regulations to them.218 It specificaly provides that Indigenous and 
Tribal peoples “shal have the right to retain their own customs and institutions, where these 
are not incompatible with fundamental rights defined by the national legal system and with 
internationaly recognized human rights”.219 
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  Customary law is directly or indirectly recognised in over 110 national 
constitutions,220 primarily through the recognition of cultural rights. In Papua New Guinea, 
the Constitution of 1975 subordinates inherited British common law to customary law.221 The 
Constitution of Botswana prohibits the legislature from proceeding on any Bil that would 
afect the organisation, powers or administration of customary law, customary courts or tribal 
organisation until it has been referred to the House of Chiefs222. In South Africa the 
constitutional court has held that Indigenous law must be seen as ‘an integral part of our law’ 
and as such ‘[i]ts validity must now be determined by reference not to common law, but to 
the Constitution.’223 The same court has also embraced the traditional African legal concept 
of ubuntu (humanness) in many of its decisions. Both the Ecuadorian and Bolivian 
constitutions incorporate the indigenous Quechua legal concept of sumac kawsay (buen vivir) 
which embraces the broad notion of wel-being and cohabitation with others and Nature. The 
Ecuadorian constitution gives specific recognition to the rights of Pachamama (Mother 
Earth), a concept enshrined in the Law of Mother Earth in Bolivia. This notion of rights of 
nature is also be found in the Whanganui River Setlement in New Zealand, which, at the 
behest of Māori, invests the river with legal identity. 
  The foregoing examples of innovative developments in law and jurisprudence serve 
as evidence of an emerging body of intercultural justice and equity. These examples of state 
law incorporating aspects of indigenous law are mirored by Indigenous law making, which 
often looks to aspects of external law as the model for internal regulation. This blending 
process ofers the possibility of drawing upon the best aspects of al legal regimes in order to 
develop the legal instruments and structures necessary for the chalenges we now face. Where 
carefuly constructed hybridized legal instruments may serve as functional interfaces between 
customary and positive law regimes. A growing example of such practices is the development 
by Indigenous peoples of a range of protocols to act as a guide to their rights and consent 
procedures. 
 
  4. Biocultural Protocols 
 Indigenous peoples already have their own internal protocols for dealing with 
management and use of their lands, resources and cultural heritage. While known to 
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Indigenous peoples themselves these protocols are often invisible to outsiders. Over the past 
10 -15 years Indigenous peoples, in many parts of the world, have begun to see biocultural 
protocols as a means to demarcate their land, resource and knowledge rights and as a means 
to provide would be users with guidance on seeking prior informed consent in accordance 
with customary law.224 
  The Nagoya Protocol cals upon states to support the development of community 
protocols.225 At the international level support for such eforts could look beyond the purely 
local level to examine the potential of developing people wide, cross border, regional and 
even global protocols to act as interfaces between customary and positive law in the quest for 
securing Indigenous peoples’ human rights. In this vein, the Inuit Circumpolar Conference 
(Canada office) has prepared a draft project proposal for the progressive development of an 
Inuit wide biocultural protocol. 
  An Inuit wide Protocol could help provide clear guidance to states and third parties of 
Inuit rights, interests and goals, with regards to the conservation and sustainable use of their 
lands, waters, biological and other resources and cultural heritage. Although not of itself 
immediately binding a Protocol of this nature may be seen as a soft law instrument based on 
Inuit law and legal philosophy. Similarly, a Sami wide Protocol could have a major influence 
on national and regional law making. Building on synergies in Sami and Inuit law and legal 
philosophy a process of colective Protocol building would serve as a means of self-
empowerment of Arctic peoples. 
  By taking the initiative and defining the criteria for the recognition of their rights over 
their lands, traditional territories, biocultural resources and traditional knowledge, Indigenous 
peoples bring pressure on states to respect and recognise the role of customary law in 
securing their human rights. Exercise of their law making rights may also help to define the 
parameters of customary international law on the Arctic and Arctic peoples’ rights, by forcing 
a reaction from states to their initiatives.226 
 
  5. Conclusion 
  National and international recognition of customary law is on the rise, as is the 
incorporation of Indigenous legal principles in constitutional law. This is important for the 
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emergence and enforcement of intercultural justice and equity. Indigenous peoples’ legal 
regimes are a rich source of law and legal philosophy, and their protection is vital for 
maintenance of global juridiversity. Development of Arctic protocols by Inuit and Sami 
would amount to a clear exercise of their  rights to self- determination over their lands, 
resources and cultural heritage. 
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Figure 1: The Map of Arctic Canada (Myron King, Environmental Policy Institute, Memorial University of Newfoundland - 
Grenfel Campus) 
